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ABSTRACT 
 
Consumers experience negative emotions, such as anger and anxiety, for a 
variety of reasons. Research has shown that emotions such as these often spillover and 
effect downstream decisions that are unrelated to the source of the emotion. This 
research examines the effect of anger and anxiety on such incidental decisions. First, I 
look at how anxiety from falling behind on goals effects financial decision making.  I 
show that anxiety activates the desire to catch up with the goal, which in turn activates 
the desire to be more efficient with resources, such as time and money. This desire not 
only causes anxious consumers’ to seek efficiency with their resources while pursuing 
the goal, but also causes them to seek efficiency while making unrelated decisions, such 
as while shopping, or while choosing between different discretionary activities. 
Consequently, because discounted goods and activities (i.e., activities that can be done 
faster than usual) take fewer resources than usual, I find that anxiety increases proneness 
for discounts. Second, I examine the effect of anger and anxiety on self-control 
behaviors. I find that anger and anxiety, unlike neutral emotion, activate specific needs. 
Anxiety activates the need for security, while anger activates the need for dominance. As 
a consequence anxiety enhances self-control when self-control provides security benefits 
rather than inconsistent benefits, such as dominance. On the other hand, anger enhances 
self-control when self-control provides dominance benefits rather than inconsistent 
benefits, such as security. Since many self-control behaviors provide both benefits - such 
as savings providing both wealth related status, and greater financial security - 
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motivating self-control through its association with the consistent benefit can increase it 
among anxious and angry individuals.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
In this research, I look at the effect of specific negative emotions on consumption 
behaviors. In the first essay, I examine how anxiety effects financial decisions. To 
examine anxiety’s effect on financial decisions, I break down anxiety into two distinct 
types, depending on whether anxiety is induced during a goal, or by events that 
individuals cannot control. When individuals experience anxiety while working on 
personal goals, such as a challenging work assignment, or a project that has a tight 
deadline, they experience what we call active anxiety. On the other hand, when 
individuals experience anxiety due to threats that cannot be acted upon, such as an 
economic recession, a terrorist attack, or an outbreak of a viral disease, they experience 
what we call passive anxiety.  
Active anxiety, unlike passive anxiety induces the desire to catch up with the 
goal (Carver and White 1994; Hobfoll 1989; Inzlicht and Legault 2014). Because active 
anxiety motivates consumers to catch up with their goals, it activates the desire to be 
more efficient or productive with resources, such as time or money. For instance, a 
student who feels anxious while studying infers that she needs to study more chapters 
every hour than she had earlier planned to study. Similarly, a wage earner who feels 
anxious while managing his monthly expenses infers that he needs to cover a greater 
share of his monthly expenses with every dollar than he had earlier planned. 
Consequently, I predict and show that active anxiety also causes consumers to seek 
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efficiency in contexts unrelated to the source of anxiety, such as while shopping or while 
choosing between activities. Specifically, I find that active anxiety increases discount 
proneness, and overconsumption after paying a fixed cost for unlimited consumption, 
such as at an all-you-can-eat buffet. 
However, it’s important to note that efficiency seeking does not always result in 
good or rational behavior. For instance, discount proneness, and overconsuming after 
paying a fixed cost, such as at a buffet, can often hurt consumers’ long term goals, such 
as that of saving money (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton 1990; Thaler 1985), or of 
healthy eating. Therefore, even though efficiency according to lay wisdom usually refers 
to good, and optimal choices, efficiency seeking as prior literature and I conceptualize it, 
can potentially lead to irrational choices. In defense of this, Fernbach, Kan and Lynch 
(2016) suggest that this efficiency mindset is in fact a desire to maximize local 
efficiency, which is characterized by a local vision to get more benefit for every unit 
resource, without considering what this extra benefit means in the larger context (i.e., is 
it essential or necessary?). 
In the second essay, I examine how seemingly poor behaviors caused by negative 
emotions, such as overspending, or allocating time to less necessary activities, can be 
mitigated. Prior literature has sufficiently shown than negative emotions impair self-
control (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister 2001). For instance negative emotion cause 
consumers to overeat (Andrade 2005; Fedorikhin and Patrick 2010; Garg, Wansink, and 
Inman 2007), and to overspend money (Cryder et al. 2008). In this essay I provide for a 
way through which self-control impairments, such as these, can be minimized among 
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consumers feeling angry or anxious.  I find that anger and anxiety, unlike neutral 
emotion, activate specific needs. Anxiety activates the need for security, while anger 
activates the need for dominance. As a consequence anxiety enhances self-control when 
self-control provides security benefits rather than inconsistent benefits, such as 
dominance. On the other hand, anger enhances self-control when self-control provides 
dominance benefits rather than inconsistent benefits, such as security.  
Since many self-control behaviors provide both benefits - such as savings 
providing both wealth related status, and greater financial security - motivating self-
control through its association with the consistent benefit can increase it among anxious 
and angry individuals. For instance, angry consumers are more likely to save money 
when it helps gain wealth and power, than when it helps save for a rainy day. On the 
other hand, anxious consumers are more likely to save when it helps them save for a 
rainy day than for wealth and power. 
Across the two essays I show than negative emotions impact a wide range of 
behaviors that are unrelated to the source of the emotions. Through my research I hope 
to help consumers understand how experiencing negative emotions can affect their 
consumption patterns. For instance, by being aware that anxiety enhances their deal 
proneness, consumers may be able to cut down on overspending on deals while feeling 
actively anxious. I also want to inform strategy aimed at marketing to consumers 
experiencing negative emotions. For instance marketing products to angry consumers 
will be vastly different from marketing products to anxious consumers or consumers 
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feeling neutral. Understanding the motivations of emotional consumers can greatly 
improve how firms interact with these consumers.  
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CHAPTER 2  
HOW ANXIETY EFFECTS RESOURCE ALLOCATION: AN EFFICIENCY 
SEEKING ACCOUNT 
Introduction 
 
Consumers feel pressure to attain a wide range of goals. They want to succeed at 
work, lose weight, make friends, raise better children – even to take more steps (both 
literally and figuratively; Kasser 2002). Social media and mobile applications like 
GoalsOnTrack, LifeTick, and MyFitnessPal, have amplified this pressure by making it 
easier than ever to share goals with others, gather information about others’ goal pursuit, 
and receive feedback about one’s own progress, or the lack thereof. An increased focus 
on pursuing goals and monitoring progress has many advantages (Carver 1979; 
Gollwitzer 1999), but it also makes goal discrepancies, or the lack of goal progress, more 
salient. As a consequence, individuals regularly experience anxiety about not making as 
much goal progress as they had planned (Carver and White 1994; Hobfoll 1989; Inzlicht 
and Legault 2014).   
How does feeling anxious influence the manner in which consumers allocate 
resources, including time and money, while making decisions? We argue that the answer 
depends on the source of anxiety. People can be anxious about not making sufficient 
goal progress. But they can also be anxious about epidemics, terrorist attacks, climate 
change, and other general threats that are completely outside of their control. Anxiety 
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induced by slow goal progress (hereafter, active anxiety) is associated with a sense of 
agency and motivates consumers to increase their rate of goal progress. On the other 
hand, anxiety induced by uncontrollable threats (hereafter, passive anxiety) is associated 
with a lack of agency. Consequently, active anxiety, but not passive anxiety, makes 
consumers want to use their resources, including time and money, more efficiently in 
order to make up lost ground in goal pursuit.  
A desire to use resources efficiently (hereafter, efficiency seeking) in turn 
motivates consumers to try to accomplish more activities in less time and to acquire 
more products and services for less money. Therefore, a consumer who is anxious about 
a work deadline or an approaching exam will be more likely to (a) try to complete 
multiple activities at the same time (i.e., multitask), (b) consume more when they have 
paid an all-inclusive fixed cost compared to when they need to pay for each item (e.g. an 
all-you-can-eat buffet vs. an a la carte menu), (c) select activities that can be completed 
in less time than normal when planning their schedule, (d) select products that cost less 
than normal (e.g., discounted products) when choosing between an assortment of items, 
and (e) select options that avoid additional charges and fees (e.g., shipping expenses). 
Conversely, because passive anxiety results from uncontrollable threats, it neither 
signals insufficient goal progress nor activates a desire for efficiency. Consequently, 
passively anxious consumers are no more motivated to accomplish more in less time or 
buy more for less money than consumers who are not anxious. For instance, consumers 
who are anxious about a terrorist attack or an approaching storm will not be more likely 
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to multitask or to overconsume after paying for unlimited consumption than consumers 
in a neutral emotional state.  
Our research contributes to the literature in four ways. One, we distinguish 
between two qualitatively distinct types of anxiety that have different sources and 
different consequences on consumer behavior. Two, we demonstrate that anxiety that 
stems from slow goal progress influences a wide range of decisions by changing how 
consumers allocate their time and money. We thereby demonstrate that being anxious 
about a work deadline or upcoming exam influences apparently unrelated decisions, 
such as how consumers schedule their leisure activities and which items they purchase 
on a shopping trip. Three, we identify why and when anxiety causes consumers to 
engage in counter-productive activities and make unnecessary purchases. Increased 
efficiency seeking helps explain why anxiety can lead to a series of maladaptive 
decisions that often make it more difficult for consumers to complete their focal goals. 
Four, although past research has examined how perceptions of goal progress influence 
subsequent decisions related to that goal (Huang and Zhang 2011; Khan and Dhar 2006; 
Zhang, Fishbach, and Dhar 2007), there is little work on how perceptions of goal 
progress (or lack thereof) influence unrelated decisions. By studying the effects of 
anxiety experienced during goal pursuit, we demonstrate how perceptions of goal 
progress influence a wider range of decisions.  
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Anxiety and Efficiency Seeking 
 
Consumers pursue a wide variety of goals in their day-to-day lives. Achieving 
these goals, however, is difficult. Unplanned obstacles and distracting opportunities 
regularly impede consumers’ goal progress. For example, having a flu or deciding to go 
to a party instead of studying could slow a student’s progress towards earning their 
degree. As goal progress slows, consumers perceive a discrepancy between where they 
planned to be and where they actually are with respect to their goal (Carver 1979; Carver 
and Scheier 1990; Carver and White 1994). For instance, a student who has not studied 
for an approaching exam might perceive a discrepancy between how much she thinks 
she should have studied and how much she has actually studied.  
Noticing a discrepancy in goal progress signals that progress is going badly, 
which activates negative emotions, such as disappointment, frustration, or anxiety 
(Carver and Scheier 1990; Carver and White 1994; Hsee and Abelson 1991; Hsee, 
Abelson, and Salovey 1991; Inzlicht, Bartholow, and Hirsh 2015; Inzlicht and Legault 
2014). Negative emotions signal that consumers need to adjust their behavior. Different 
negative emotions, however, signal different impediments to goal progress and motivate 
different responses (Carver and Scheier 1990; Ford and Tamir 2012; Millgram et al. 
2015; Tamir 2016; Tooby and Cosmides 1990). Disappointment signals that a goal is no 
longer attainable and motivates consumers to release the goal and try something else 
(Salerno, Laran, and Janiszewski 2014). Frustration, on the other hand, signals that some 
external factor is obstructing the consumer’s path to the goal, but that it hasn’t lowered 
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the probability of attaining the goal (Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009). Consequently, it 
motivates consumers to remove the obstruction in order to get back on track. Anxiety, 
the focus of our research, indicates that the discrepancy may have lowered the 
probability of the goal attainment (Carver and Scheier 1990; Carver and White 1994; 
Inzlicht and Legault 2014). For instance, encountering traffic while driving to the airport 
can cause frustration if the driver is confident they will still be able to catch their flight, 
anxiety if the driver perceives a risk of missing the flight, or disappointment, if the driver 
is certain they will miss the flight. Therefore, anxiety is experienced when the 
discrepancy in the rate of goal progress threatens but does not eliminate the possibility of 
goal attainment. This anxiety signals to consumers that they are lagging behind on their 
goals, but that they can potentially make up for it by speeding up their rate of progress.  
Anxiety, however is not only experienced when individuals make insufficient 
goal progress. In general, anxiety is experienced when individuals perceive a threat 
(Raghunathan and Pham 1999; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Sometimes this threat is the 
result of a consumer not making sufficient goal progress (Carver and Scheier 1990; 
Inzlicht and Legault 2014), but other times the threat is the result of an environmental 
factor outside of the consumer’s control (Durante and Laran 2016). In former case, 
which we call active anxiety, consumers retain agency in that they have the ability to 
potentially remove or overcome the anxiety inducing threat. In the latter case, which we 
call passive anxiety, consumers do not retain agency in that they do not have the ability 
to resolve or remove the anxiety inducing threat. An individual struggling to lose weight, 
a student facing a difficult exam, and a consumer researcher approaching a conference 
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deadline would all be feeling active anxiety because the outcome of the situations will 
depend largely on their behavior. Passive anxiety, on the other hand, occurs when 
individuals are worried about a threat that is caused by circumstances outside of their 
control, such as the spread of a virus, global warming, a terrorist attack, or waiting for 
the grade after taking an exam. Because passive anxiety results from the threat of events 
beyond one’s control, it does not signal the need to make faster goal progress. We 
therefore predict that active anxiety, but not passive anxiety, will motivate consumers to 
make faster goal progress. 
How can consumers who are feeling actively anxious improve their rate of goal 
progress? One way is by using their resources more efficiently. That is, they can try to 
get more value for every unit of resource they spend. For example, a student who is 
anxious about not having studied enough can try to make up for lost time by speed-
reading text book chapters. Similarly, a consumer who is anxious about exceeding his 
monthly budget might be more likely to clip coupons or purchase items on sale in 
attempt to spend his money more efficiently. In sum, we hypothesize that experiencing 
active anxiety (i.e., anxiety resulting from a negative discrepancy in perceived goal 
progress) makes consumers try to use their resources more efficiently compared to 
experiencing either passive anxiety or no anxiety.  
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Active Anxiety and Resource Allocation 
 
Resources refer to tangible and intangible assets that individuals and institutions 
can exchange in order to reach their goals (Dorsch, Törnblom, and Kazemi 2016; 
Hobfoll 1989). We focus on two resources that consumers are especially likely to utilize 
during goal pursuit: time and money (Gino and Mogilner 2014; Okada and Hoch 2004; 
Zauberman and Lynch 2005). With the possible exception of the extraordinarily wealthy, 
consumers have only a limited supply of these two resources (Fernbach, Kan, and Lynch 
2015; Zauberman and Lynch 2005). The more time or money that a consumer spends on 
one goal, the less she will have available for others. Spending the night studying 
prevents a student from attending a party, just as spending $100 on a fancy dinner leaves 
a consumer less money to pay the rent.  
What happens when consumers perceive that their store of resources is 
shrinking? Fernbach and colleagues (2015) suggest that consumers use two different 
strategies in this situation. One is to try to be more efficient by squeezing more value out 
of every resource they use. For example, a shopper who is worried about running out of 
money may try to buy less expensive versions of all the items on his grocery list. The 
other strategy is to prioritize, which involves allocating resources to only the most 
important goals while either abandoning or neglecting less important goals. For example, 
a financially constrained shopper may instead decide to remove less important, or 
discretionary items from his grocery list. Consumers initially attempt to overcome a 
perceived resource constraint by using their resources more efficiently. Only when 
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resources become increasingly scarce do consumers switch from trying to be more 
efficient to prioritizing their pursuits (Carver and Scheier 1990; Carver and White 1994; 
Fernbach et al. 2015). For example, a shopper feeling slightly poor would try to find 
better deals so he could buy everything he wanted, whereas a shopper feeling really poor 
would forego the less important purchases and only buy the more important necessities. 
Feeling anxious about insufficient goal progress signals that the consumer is in 
jeopardy of not reaching her goal. Will this prompt consumers to be more efficient or to 
prioritize? There are two reasons to predict that feeling anxious about goal pursuit will 
be more likely to increase efficiency seeking than prioritization. One, anxiety signals 
that the consumer is not making sufficient progress, but that the goal is still attainable. In 
other words, anxiety indicates that resources are constrained, but not severely so, and 
milder resource constraints tend to increase efficiency seeking rather than prioritization. 
Two, when both strategies are feasible, anxious consumers should prefer seeking 
efficiency to prioritizing because prioritization is more cognitively effortful than 
efficiency seeking (Fernbach et al. 2015) and anxious consumers typically prefer less 
effortful decisions (Darke 1988; Eysenck et al. 2007; MacLeod and Donnellan 1993; 
Shackman et al. 2006; Sorg and Whitney 1992). Only when the risk of failing on the 
goal becomes high due to dire scarcity in resources, will anxious consumers be likely to 
prioritize.  
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Efficiency Seeking and Choice 
 
Volumes of studies demonstrate that emotions influence judgments and decisions 
unrelated to the source of the emotion (Avnet, Pham, and Stephen 2012; Strack 1992; 
Han, Lerner, and Keltner 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Raghunathan and Pham 1999). 
Feeling sad about the weather can cause people to report lower life satisfaction (Schwarz 
and Clore 1983), just as fear caused by a terrorist attack can make people more afraid of 
getting the flu (Lerner et al. 2003). We similarly expect that being anxious about a 
personal goal should increase efficiency seeking, regardless of whether or not the 
decision is related to the source of anxiety, across different types of resources (i.e., time 
and money). For example, if a student is anxious about not having enough time to study 
for an exam, we predict that she will not only try to use time more efficiently while 
studying, but that she will also try to use time more efficiently while performing chores 
or leisure activities, and use money more efficiently while shopping. 
Consumers perceive that they are using their resources efficiently when the 
reference cost of the benefits they expect to receive in exchange for time or money 
exceed the price they paid (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1985). For instance, if 
a consumer acquires a product that has a reference cost of $10 for $8, he would feel that 
he spent his money efficiently. Reference costs are determined by several factors, 
including the cost of similar products, services and activities in prior consumption 
instances (Helson and Harry 1964; Niedrich, Sharma, and Wedell 2001; Parducci 1965), 
the amount of resources that others have spent on similar products, services, or activities 
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(Mezias, Chen, and Murphy 2002), and the cost suggested by a retailer or other third 
party (Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan 1998; Hardie, Johnson, and Fader 1993; Kan et al. 
2014; Mayhew and Winer 1992). Consumers seeking efficiency should thus be 
especially attracted to opportunities that cost less time (e.g., a restaurant with a shorter 
than normal wait time) and less money (e.g., a pair of shoes on sale) relative to their 
reference costs. Because products available at a discount can be acquired for less than 
the reference cost, individuals seeking efficiency should be particularly attracted to 
discounts, as highlighted in the example cited earlier. Similarly, an activity that typically 
takes an hour (e.g., reading a book chapter) should seem efficient if it can be completed 
in 40 minutes (e.g., by speed-reading).  
Furthermore, efficiency seeking should not only encourage consumers to select 
products and activities on discount, but also motivate them to avoid additional fees and 
surcharges (e.g., shipping and handling), at least when the additional fees can be 
avoided. For example, suppose that shipping charges for a $25 shirt are normally $10, 
but the shipping fee is waived if the consumer spends $50 or more. In this situation, a 
consumer seeking efficiency should be more likely to make an unplanned purchase of 
another $25 shirt in order to avoid the shipping fee. In this situation, making the 
unplanned purchase would increase the consumers’ perceived efficiency by giving them 
$60 worth of purchases (i.e., reference cost for the shirts of $50 plus $10 shipping) for 
only $50, rather than giving them $35 worth of purchases (i.e., reference cost for one 
shirt plus shipping) for $35.  
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Finally, efficiency seeking should also motivate consumers to complete more 
activities in a set amount of time and consume more of a product or service for a set 
amount of money. For instance, efficiency seeking consumers should be more likely to 
attempt to complete multiple activities at the same time, as this allows them to use a 
single period of time for two activities rather than one. Similarly, efficiency seekers 
should eat more at an all-you-can eat buffet than when they have to pay to consume on 
an a la carte basis. When consumers pay a fixed cost for unlimited use (e.g. an all-you-
can eat buffet or an unlimited drink package), then each additional item that they 
consume reduces the perceived cost per item. For instance, a consumer who eats four 
slices of pizza at a $10 all-you-can eat pizza buffet ends up paying less per slice (i.e., 
$10/4 = $2.5) than a consumer who eats only two slices ($10/2 = $5). As a result, 
efficiency seeking should increase the number of items consumed when the consumer 
has paid a fixed price for unlimited consumption relative to when the consumer has to 
pay a variable price for each item.  
In sum, we predict that relative to experiencing passive anxiety and a neutral 
emotional state, experiencing active anxiety increases efficiency seeking. Additionally, 
we predict that this pursuit of efficiency should occur regardless of whether a decision 
helps consumers reach important goals. Unlike consumers who respond to a resource 
constraint by prioritizing their pursuits, consumers seeking efficiency are trying to reach 
all of their goals without adjusting or dropping any (Fernbach et al. 2015). 
Consequently, consumers anxious about a personal goal may ironically spend resources 
on other less important goals, rather than the more important ones, if the less important 
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goal can be accomplished with fewer resources than its reference cost. For instance, a 
student anxious about her exam may choose to do chores or catch up with friends over 
coffee if these activities can be completed in less time than usual, even though studying 
without interruption would probably be more beneficial. Similarly, a consumer anxious 
about a work deadline may buy products that are available at a price discount rather than 
products that satisfy active needs or goals. Thus, we predict that efficiency seeking can 
cause consumers to spend resources on efficient options that may not be important or 
relevant to their focal goals.  
In summary, we predict that active anxiety, but not passive anxiety, increases 
efficiency seeking relative to a neutral emotional state. Consequently, actively anxious 
consumers should be more likely to a) multitask, b) consume more items when they are 
billed at a fixed cost (i.e., cost independent of the number of units consumed) rather than 
a variable cost (i.e., cost dependent on the number of units consumed), c) prefer 
activities that take less time than normal (i.e., discounted activities), d) prefer price 
discounts, and e) desire to qualify for exemption from add-on costs (e.g., shipping). We 
test these predictions in five experiments in which we vary whether or not participants 
experience anxiety as well as the source of their anxiety before asking them to make one 
or more ostensibly unrelated decisions. 
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Emotion Manipulation 
 
In studies 1 through 4 we manipulated emotions using an emotion induction 
adapted from the literature (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Winterich and Haws 2011). The 
emotion induction was described as investigating common life experiences of 
participants. Specifically, we asked participants to write essays about events that make 
them feel (a) actively anxious, (b) passively anxious, or (c) neutral. In the active anxiety 
condition, we asked participants to write about the goals that are currently making them 
anxious: Most people have a lot to be anxious about–exams, jobs, maintaining healthy 
weight, getting enough sleep, and other life goals which they have trouble attaining. 
Think of a couple of such goals that you're anxious about not attaining. In the passive 
anxiety condition, we asked them to write about global threats that are currently making 
them anxious: There is a lot to be anxious about in the world today – climate change, the 
uncontrollable spread of viruses like Zika and Ebola, the rising cancer rates, the 
increase in the number of plane crashes due to bad weather, the ever-present threat of 
terrorist attacks. Think of a couple of such threats that make you feel anxious. Please 
write two-three sentences about each of these threats. In the neutral emotion condition, 
we asked participants to describe where they are currently accessing information: There 
are a lot of sources of information nowadays– internet articles, informative YouTube 
videos, resources provided by the college library, etc. Think of a couple of sources that 
you use to access information. Participants in the active and passive anxiety conditions 
next wrote about the one goal (active anxiety condition) or the one threat (passive 
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anxiety condition) that makes them the most anxious. In the neutral emotion condition, 
participants wrote about the information source that they most frequently use.  
We tested the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation by asking a sample of 
participants at a Southwestern university in the United States (N = 183) to indicate how 
anxious, worried, nervous, angry, frustrated, sad and negative they felt after completing 
the emotion manipulation on a 9-point scales (1= not at all, 9 = very much). We 
averaged the ratings for “anxious”, “worried”, and “nervous” to form a composite score 
for anxiety (α = .869). 
To examine the effects of emotions on the measure of anxiety, we conducted a 3 
(emotion: active anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral) between-subjects ANOVA. The 
results revealed the predicted main effect of emotion (F(2, 180) = 3.24, p = .041). 
Specifically, neutral participants (M = 2.50) were less anxious than participants in the 
active anxiety condition (M = 3.05; F(1, 180) = 5.35, p = .022) and participants in the 
passive anxiety condition (M = 3.00; F(1, 180) = 4.28, p = .040). On the other hand, 
actively anxious participants were just as anxious as the passively anxious participants 
(F(1, 180) = .04, NS).   
There was no effect of the emotion manipulation on frustration (F(2, 180) = .06, 
NS) nor anger (F(2, 180) = 1.15, NS). However, the emotion manipulation did influence 
sadness (F(2, 179) = 4.82, p = .01), such that passively anxious participants (M = 2.42) 
were significantly more sad than actively anxious participants (M = 1.76; F(1, 179) = 
8.95, p = .003) and neutral participants (M = 1.92; F(1, 179) = 5.15, p = .025). 
Participants in the neutral and active anxiety condition did not differ in sadness (F(1, 
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179) = .53, NS). This is not completely unexpected, since the themes that evoke passive 
anxiety, such as diseases, climate change, terrorist attacks, can also simultaneously 
remind individuals about events in the past (e.g., death of a loved one, the Japanese 
Tsunami, 9/11, or the crash of the Malaysian Airlines flight) that evoke sadness. 
However, the increase in sadness in the passive anxiety condition cannot possibly 
explain our predicted results because, as earlier described, sadness should not affect 
efficiency seeking. Furthermore, sadness can’t explain the difference between neutral 
and active anxiety conditions. 
 
Study 1 
 
Our first study examined the effect of the different kinds of anxiety on efficiency 
seeking by examining whether and when anxiety makes online workers more likely to 
multitask. To do so, we tested whether participants chose to complete a series of tasks in 
an online study simultaneously rather than sequentially. By choosing to multitask, 
participants can use their time in a seemingly more efficient manner, making progress on 
both the activities at once. However, although multitasking allows participants to 
complete more tasks per every unit of time, the efficiency comes at a cost: reduced 
attention towards the tasks, which usually leads to worse performance (Han and 
Broniarczyk 2016). We thus predicted that actively anxious participants would be more 
likely to work on two activities simultaneously (rather than sequentially) compared to 
participants who are passively anxious and participants who are not anxious. We also 
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predicted that participants who chose to multi-task would perform worse on the 
activities.  
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and seventy-five participants (126 males) recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small 
payment. The experiment had a three condition (active anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral 
emotion) between-subject design. The study contained two parts disguised as unrelated 
studies. In the first part, participants were randomly assigned to an emotion condition 
using the aforementioned essay writing task. After the writing task, participants were 
asked to take two additional studies. The first study required them to memorize a list of 
German vocabulary words; the second study required them to watch and evaluate a 
video about twins (see Appendix B). They were the given the option to either complete 
the studies simultaneously (i.e., multitask) or sequentially (adapted from Han and 
Broniarczyk 2016). When participants chose to multitask, they were shown the list of 
German words and the video on the same screen. When they chose to perform the tasks 
sequentially, they were shown the list of German words and the video on different 
screens, one after the other. Choice of task (simultaneous = 1, sequential = 0) served as 
our key dependent variable. After memorizing the words and watching the video, 
memory for the tasks was measured using five questions (see Appendix B). The score on 
the memory-recall quiz served as a measure of task performance. 
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For all of the studies including this one, we made an a priori decision to filter out 
respondents who had previously completed either an older version of the study, or the 
essay manipulation (see appendix A for detailed filtering criteria). The sample sizes 
reported in each of the studies are the final counts after removing participants who did 
not qualify.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
In line with our predictions, the emotion manipulation significantly affected the 
likelihood that a participant chose to multitask (Wald χ²(2) = 6.264, p = .044). Because 
we predicted that the active anxiety condition would be different than the passive anxiety 
and neutral conditions, we interpreted the data by testing two orthogonal contrasts (Judd, 
McClelland, and Ryan 2011): (contrast A) the difference between the active anxiety 
condition and the other two conditions, and (contrast B) the difference between the 
passive anxiety and neutral conditions. As predicted, actively anxious participants were 
more likely to multitask (60.49%) than both passively anxious participants (48.89%) and 
participants in the neutral emotion condition (41.84%; contrast A: Wald χ²(1) = 5.658, p 
= .017). Passively anxious participants were no more likely to multitask than neutral 
participants (contrast B: Wald χ²(1) = .536, NS). The results thus indicate that active 
anxiety increases efficiency seeking more than passive anxiety and neutral emotion. 
Also, as predicted, we found that although participants who chose to multitask took less 
time to complete the two tasks (Mmultitasking = 119.67 seconds vs. Msequential-tasking = 141.74 
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seconds, F(1, 273) = 6.5, p = .0114), they also performed worse on the subsequent 
memory quiz (Mmultitasking = 3.81 vs. Msequential-tasking = 4.08, F(1, 273) = 3.86, p = .050).   
This study provides initial support for our prediction that active anxiety increases 
efficiency seeking more than both passive anxiety and neutral emotion. We show that 
this need for efficiency under conditions of active anxiety manifests not just in a 
preference for multi-tasking, but also in faster completion of the tasks, albeit at the cost 
of accuracy. In the next study, we test if actively anxious participants also seek 
efficiency with money, as they do with time. 
 
Study 2 
 
Whereas our first study found that being actively anxious makes consumers try to 
spend their time more efficiently, our second study tests whether active anxiety similarly 
makes consumers try to spend their money more efficiently. To do so, we examined how 
emotions influence the consumption of services when they are billed at a fixed rather 
than at a variable cost. When services are billed at a fixed cost, the price that consumers 
pay is independent of the number of units consumed. Consuming greater number of 
units, consequently, reduces the price paid per unit. That is, consuming more units gives 
consumers more “bang for their buck.” On the other hand, when services have a variable 
cost that depends on the number of units consumed, consuming greater number of units 
does not facilitate efficiency; the price paid per unit remains the same. Therefore, we 
measured efficiency seeking in this study by comparing how much food and drink 
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participants indicated they would consume if they had to pay a fixed price for unlimited 
consumption with how much they indicated they would consume if they had to pay a 
variable price for each item. 
If active anxiety increases efficiency seeking, we should see a larger difference in 
consumption between the fixed cost “all-you-can-eat/drink” menu and the variable cost 
“pay-per-item” menu for participants who are actively anxious than for passively 
anxious or neutral participants. To test this, we experimentally manipulated participants’ 
emotion before asking them how many pizza slices or drinks they would like to 
consume. Additionally, we examined the extent to which participants’ choice intentions 
depended on whether they had ostensibly paid for unlimited servings or had to ostensibly 
pay for each slice of pizza or drink they consumed. Regardless of emotion, we expected 
that participants would consume more in the fixed cost condition than the variable cost 
condition; however, we predicted that the increase in consumption between the fixed and 
variable cost conditions would be larger when participants were actively anxious than 
when they were passively anxious or in a neutral emotional state. 
 
Method 
 
Four hundred and thirty-two (239 males) participants recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small payment. 
The experiment had a 3 (emotion: active anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral emotion) x 2 
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(payment option: fixed cost, variable cost) x 2 (choice replicate: pizza, drinks) between 
subject design.  
The study contained two parts disguised as unrelated studies. In the first part, 
participants were randomly assigned to the emotion condition using the essay 
manipulation from study 1. After completing the emotion manipulation, participants 
proceeded to the second part of the study (see appendix B). Participants in the pizza 
condition were asked to imagine that they were at a pizza restaurant. In the fixed cost 
condition, participants read that they had paid $12 for the pizza buffet and could eat as 
many slices as they wanted. In the variable cost condition, participants read that they 
could eat as many slices as they wanted for $4 each. The dependent measure was how 
many slices of pizza participants said they would like to eat on a scale from 0 to 16+ 
slices. Similarly, participants in the drink condition were asked to imagine that they were 
at a party at a private venue. Participants in the fixed cost condition read that they had 
paid $20 for an unlimited beverage package and could have as many drinks as they 
wanted, whereas those in the variable cost condition read that they could have as many 
drinks as they wanted for $5 each. The dependent measure was how many drinks 
participants said they would like to consume on a scale from 0 to 10+ drinks. 
After choosing how many servings they would like to eat or drink, participants 
also indicated how many slices of pizza they typically eat in a meal (0 to 16+) and how 
many drinks they typically have at a social gathering (0 to 10+). We used these measures 
as covariates in the pizza and drink conditions, respectively, in order to control for 
individual differences in appetite and thirst. Finally, participants indicated their gender, 
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age, whether or not they were trying to lose weight, and whether or not they had 
previously completed any of parts of the study before.  
 
Results 
 
To test the effects of emotions on consumption, we conducted a 3 (emotion: 
active anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral emotion) x 2 (purchase option: fixed cost, 
variable cost) x 2 (replicate: pizza, drinks) between subjects ANCOVA, controlling for 
participants’ baseline consumption of pizza and drinks. The effect of emotions on 
consumption in the fixed cost and the variable cost condition did not differ by replicate 
(three-way interaction, F(2, 419) = 1.13, NS). Furthermore, the two-way interaction 
between emotion and replicate (F(2, 431) = .61, NS) was also not significant. Thus, we 
collapsed the results across pizza and drinks. 
As expected, participants chose to have more servings in the fixed cost condition, 
compared to the variable cost condition (F(1, 425) = 155.12, p < .001). But, consistent 
with our prediction, active anxiety increased the difference in consumption between the 
fixed cost condition and the variable cost condition (Mfixed = 5.37 vs. Mvariable = 2.77) 
more than both passive anxiety (Mfixed = 4.86 vs. Mvariable = 2.98) and neutral emotion 
(Mfixed = 4.87vs. Mvariable = 3.13; contrast A: F(1, 425) = 4.96, p = .027; see figure 2-1). 
This occurred because actively anxious participants consumed more in the fixed cost 
condition than both passively anxious and neutral participants (contrast A: F(1, 425) = 
4.07, p = .044). Meanwhile consumption in variable cost condition was the same across 
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the active anxiety, passive anxiety and neutral conditions (F(1, 425) = 1.28, NS). The 
difference between the fixed and variable cost conditions was similar for participants in 
the passive anxiety and neutral emotion conditions (contrast B: F(1, 425) =.12, NS). 
Passive anxiety neither increased consumption in the fixed cost condition (F(1, 425) 
=.00, NS), nor suppressed consumption in the variable cost condition (F(1, 425) =.29, 
NS), more than the neutral emotion. Participants’ baseline consumption of pizza and 
drinks also had an impact on consumption (F(1, 425) = 287.56, p < .0001). The focal 
contrast remained significant when excluding the covariate from the analysis. Active 
anxiety increased the difference in consumption between the fixed cost condition and the 
variable cost condition (Mfixed = 5.46 vs. Mvariable = 2.29), significantly more than both 
passive anxiety (Mfixed = 4.98 vs. Mvariable = 2.95) and neutral emotion (Mfixed = 5.22 vs. 
Mvariable = 3.07; contrast A: F(1, 427) = 5.42, p = .020).  
 
FIGURE 2-1 
STUDY 2: CONSUMPTION OF PIZZA AND DRINKS 
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Discussion 
 
Study 2 demonstrates that active anxiety motives consumers to use their money 
efficiently, as it does with time (study 1). Actively anxious participants indicated they 
would consume more pizza slices at a fixed-cost all-you-can-eat buffet and more 
beverages after purchasing an unlimited-drinks package compared to participants who 
were passively anxious or in a neutral emotional state. On the other hand, when the price 
depends on the units consumed, active anxiety did not increase consumption relative to 
passive anxiety or no anxiety.  
 
Study 3 
 
Study 3 examined how efficiency seeking among actively anxious participants 
influences preference for discounted products and discounted activities (i.e., activities 
that can be completed in less time than usual). Because active anxiety motivates 
efficiency seeking, it should increase preference for both discounted products and 
discounted activities more than passive anxiety and a neutral emotional state. To test 
this, we experimentally manipulated participants’ emotional state before asking them to 
complete either a hypothetical shopping task or a hypothetical scheduling task. The 
shopping task included an assortment of products to choose from, whereas the 
scheduling task included an assortment of activities to choose from. In both tasks, the 
assortments contained a mix of discounted and undiscounted options. Furthermore, to 
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test whether the preference for discounts generalizes across different types of products 
and activities, the assortments contained a mix of both hedonic and utilitarian products 
and activities. We predicted that actively anxious participants would be more likely to 
select discounted products and activities, regardless of whether the products and 
activities were hedonic or utilitarian. 
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and ninety-one undergraduate students at a Southwestern university 
in the United States completed a study in exchange for course credit. The experiment 
had a 3 (emotion: active anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral emotion) x 2 (task: shopping 
vs. scheduling) x 2 (replicate one, replicate two) x 2 (option cost: discounted, regular) x 
2 (option benefit: hedonic, utilitarian) mixed design. The emotion, task, and replicate 
were manipulated between-subject. The option cost and option benefit were manipulated 
within-subjects.  
The study contained two parts disguised as unrelated studies. In the first part, 
participants were randomly assigned to an emotion induction condition. After 
completing the emotion manipulation described in study 1, participants proceeded to the 
second part of the experiment, which was disguised as an unrelated study. Participants in 
the shopping condition chose products in a hypothetical shopping task, whereas 
participants in the scheduling condition chose activities in a hypothetical scheduling 
task.  
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In the shopping task, participants were shown eight different products worth $32, 
and asked to choose a basket of products that cost no more than $15 (see appendix B). 
Four of the eight products were hedonic: a box of donuts, Doritos, a movie DVD, and 
Oreo cookies. The other four products were utilitarian: a toothbrush, sunscreen, toilet 
paper, and Ziploc bags. Orthogonally, half of the products were listed as being on sale 
for an ostensibly discounted price. We counterbalanced which items were discounted 
using two between-subject replicate conditions. In one of the replicate condition, 
Doritos, sunscreen, DVD, and Ziploc bags were offered at a discount, whereas the other 
products were not. In the other replicate condition, Oreo cookies, donuts, toilet paper, 
and toothbrush were offered at a discount, whereas the other products were not. 
Therefore, each product was listed on sale in one of the replicates, and listed at regular 
price in the other replicate. In actuality, we held the final price of each product constant 
across the two replicates, but varied the price before discount. For example, participants 
in replicate 1 read that the box of donuts is not on sale and costs $5 and the movie DVD 
is on sale for $6 instead of $9. On the other hand, participants in replicate 2 read that the 
box of donuts is on sale for $5 instead of $8 and the movie DVD is not on sale and costs 
$6.  
The procedure in the scheduling condition was similar, except that instead of 
shopping for products while on budget, participants selected activities while having a 
time constraint. Participants read a list of activities that collectively required 300 minutes 
to complete and were asked to schedule activities they would like to complete in the next 
120 minutes (see appendix B). Four of the eight activities were hedonic: browsing 
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updates on Facebook and other social media, catching up with friends over coffee or 
drinks, watching a TV show, and eating at your favorite restaurant. The other four 
activities were utilitarian: replying to work or school emails, doing an assignment, 
shopping for groceries, and doing laundry. Again, half of the activities could be 
completed in less time than normal, whereas the other four were not available at a time 
discount. We counterbalanced which items were discounted using two between-subjects 
replicate conditions. In one of the replicate condition, eating at a restaurant, replying to 
work email, catching up with friends over coffee, and shopping for groceries were 
offered at a discount, whereas the other activities were not. In the other replicate 
condition, browsing updates on social media, watching a TV show, doing laundry, and 
doing an assignment were offered at a discount, whereas the other activities were not. 
Therefore, each activity was listed on discount in one of the replicates, and listed at 
regular duration in the other replicate. In actuality, we held the final duration of each 
activity constant across the two replicates, but varied the duration before discount. For 
example, some participants read that the browsing Facebook and social media would 
take the usual 20 minutes, while catching up with friends would take 30 minutes instead 
of the usual 45 minutes. Other participants, read that browsing Facebook and social 
media would take 20 minutes instead of the usual 30 minutes, while catching up with 
friends would take the usual 30 minutes.  
We measured preference for discounts by calculating the percentage of 
participants’ total budget (time or money) that they spent on discounted options. Because 
discounts allow individuals to acquire products and complete activities with fewer 
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resources than the reference cost, we predicted that active anxiety would increase 
preference for discounts more than passive anxiety and neutral emotion. We similarly 
measured preference for hedonic options by calculating percentage of the money or time 
that participants allocated to the hedonic options, although we did not predict that 
participant’s emotion would influence this measure. 
 
Pretest 
 
We conducted a pretest with undergraduate students at a Southwestern university 
in the United States (N=120) to confirm that the hedonic products were associated with 
greater pleasure and the utilitarian products were associated with greater utility. 
Specifically, we asked participants to indicate to what extent they thought each of the 
products and activities seemed fun on a 5-point scale (1= Not at all fun, 5 = Very fun). 
We also asked participants to indicate to what extent they thought each of the products 
and activities seemed practical and necessary on a 5-point scale (1= Not at all practical 
and necessary, 5 = Very practical and necessary). As expected, the ratings of fun and 
practicality significantly differed across the hedonic and utilitarian products. Hedonic 
products were rated as being significantly more fun than utilitarian products, whereas 
utilitarian products were significantly more practical than hedonic products (all p’s < 
.05). Similarly, hedonic activities were significantly more fun than utilitarian activities, 
whereas utilitarian activities were significantly more practical than hedonic activities (all 
p’s < .05).  
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Results 
 
We examined participants’ likelihood to select discounted products and activities 
in the shopping and the scheduling task using a 3 (emotion: active anxiety, passive 
anxiety, neutral emotion) x 2 (task: shopping vs. scheduling) x 2 (replicate one vs. 
replicate two) between-subjects ANOVA. The effect of emotions on the preference for 
discounts in the shopping task and the scheduling task did not differ by replicates (three-
way interaction, F(2, 279) = .89, NS). Furthermore, the two-way interaction between 
emotion and replicate was also not significant (F(2, 279) = .74, NS). Thus, we collapsed 
the results across replicates.  
In line with our predictions, active anxiety significantly influenced efficiency 
seeking, boosting both the share of discounted products selected in the shopping task and 
share of discounted activities in the scheduling task (F(2, 285) = 4.68, p = .01; see figure 
2-2). Moreover, the effect of emotions was similar across the shopping task and the 
scheduling task (two-way interaction, F(2, 285) = .36, NS). As predicted, active anxiety 
increased the share of discounted options (57%) more than both passive anxiety (50%) 
and neutral emotion (48%; contrast A: F(1, 285) = 9.35, p = .002). Actively anxious 
shoppers selected more discounted products (57%) than both passively anxious (50%) 
and neutral shoppers (48%). Similarly, actively anxious participants selected more 
discounted activities (60%) than passively anxious participants (48%) and neutral 
participants (50%). On the other hand, passively anxious participants did not select any 
more discounted options than neutral participants (contrast B: F(1, 285) = .01, NS).  
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We further tested if actively anxious participants exhibited greater preference for 
utilitarian discounts and hedonic discounts. To do so we conducted a 3 (emotion: active 
anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral emotion) x 2 (task: shopping vs. scheduling) x 2 
(product or activity type: hedonic, utilitarian; within-subjects) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. We measured preference for discounts across hedonic and utilitarian options 
by calculating the percentage of participants’ total resource investment that they spent on 
hedonic discounted options, and on utilitarian discounted options. The data showed no 
evidence that the effect of active anxiety on preference for discounts is different across 
utilitarian options and hedonic options (two-way interaction; F(2, 285) = 2.14, p = .120).  
 
FIGURE 2-2  
STUDY 3: CHOICE OF DISCOUNTED OPTIONS 
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Discussion  
 
Actively anxious shoppers were more likely to select products that cost less than 
usual, just as actively anxious schedulers were more likely to select activities that could 
be completed in less time than usual. These results replicate findings from previous 
studies. Importantly, we find that actively anxious participants are more likely to seek 
efficiency across both monetary as well as time resources. In the next study, we test 
whether anxiety increases efficiency seeking across a trade-off between time and money 
using a field experiment. 
 
Study 4 
   
Study 4 examined whether experiencing active anxiety increases the tendency to 
select options offering a more efficient trade-off between money and time rather than 
options offering a higher total monetary pay-out. The study asked participants recruited 
on Mechanical Turk to choose between two studies that varied in their payment amount 
and length after writing essays that induced either active anxiety, passive anxiety, or 
neutral emotion. Although the longer study offered a higher payment (i.e., higher overall 
benefit) compared to the shorter study, it paid less money per minute (i.e., lower benefit 
per cost ratio), and therefore offered a less efficient cross resource trade-off than the 
shorter study. The study design lets us test whether active anxiety increases a general 
desire for money rather than a desire to efficiently use both time and money. If actively 
anxious participants want to maximize their financial resources, then they should be 
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more likely to select the better paying but less efficient study. Conversely, if actively 
anxious participants want to maximize efficiency, as we predict, then they should be 
more likely to select the lower paying but more efficient study.  
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and fifteen participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small payment. The 
experiment randomly assigned participants to one of three emotion conditions (active 
anxiety, passive anxiety, neutral emotion) in which they performed the same writing task 
as in study 1. After the writing task, participants chose between completing one of two 
ostentatiously unrelated bonus studies. They could either choose to complete a study that 
took 3 minutes and paid 30 cents (efficient study), or a long study that took 10 minutes 
and paid 50 cents (high pay study). The choice of the efficient study was coded as one, 
while choice of the high pay study was coded as zero.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
In line with our predictions, actively anxious participants were more likely to 
choose the efficient study (52.38%) than both passively anxious (35.13%) and neutral 
participants (33.33%) (contrast A: Wald χ²(1) = 6.031, p = .014). On the other hand, 
passively anxious participants were no more likely to choose the efficient study than 
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neutral participants (contrast B: Wald χ²(1) = .055, NS). This study shows that efficiency 
seeking increases actively anxious participants’ likelihood of choosing activities that 
reward greater compensation per every unit of time. Just as active anxiety motivates 
consumers to spend time efficiently (study 1 and study 3) and money efficiently (study 2 
and study 3), it also motivates them to efficiently exchange one resource for another by 
selecting an option that offers more money per unit of time. 
 
Study 5 
   
Our studies thus far demonstrate that when consumers are anxious about poor 
goal progress, they try to use their time and money more efficiently in subsequent 
decisions. Active anxiety typically signals that a consumer has not progressed towards a 
goal quickly enough. The focus on slow goal progress prompts consumers to use their 
resources more efficiently, a strategy that makes sense as long as they perceive that they 
have a large enough store of resources to reach their goals. If resources are perceived to 
be scarce, however, then being efficient may not be sufficient; consumers will need to 
prioritize by focusing their limited resources on only their most important objectives 
(Fernbach et al. 2015; Shah, Shafir, and Mullainathan 2015; Spiller 2011). Therefore, 
when anxiety causes consumers to think about running out of resources, rather than 
about how their progress has been slower than expected, they should be more likely to 
prioritize their most important goals rather than trying to accomplish everything more 
efficiently. We thus predict that when anxious consumers focus on resource scarcity 
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rather than slow goal progress, they will be more likely to conserve resources for only 
their most important goals rather than spend them efficiently on less important pursuits.  
How will the shift from seeking efficiency to conserving resources change the 
financial decisions that consumers make? In many situations, both the desire for 
efficiency and the desire to save money will motivate consumers to buy discounted 
products and avoid add-on fees. But in other situations, the desire to be efficient may 
conflict with the desire to save money. Consider an online retailer that offers free 
shipping to consumers who spend at least $100, but otherwise charges a $15 shipping 
fee. A consumer purchasing a $50 pair of shoes can increase perceived efficiency by 
spending another $50 on items that she doesn’t really need in order to qualify for free 
shipping. However, doing so depletes the consumer’s store of resources; the consumer 
could better save money by paying the $15 shipping fee and saving the $35 difference in 
price for more important expenditures. On the other hand, a consumer purchasing the 
$50 pair of shoes can both increase efficiency and save money by waiting to place the 
order until she needs to buy something else that costs $50, and then combining the two 
orders to get free shipping.  
 In study 5, we test this hypothesis. Specifically, we examine how being anxious 
about slow goal progress, anxious about resource scarcity, or not anxious influences 
when consumers try to avoid a shipping fee. When consumers can only avoid paying a 
shipping fee by making additional, unplanned purchases, we predict that consumers who 
are anxious about slow goal progress should be more likely to make the unplanned 
purchase than either consumers who are anxious about running out of resources or 
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consumers who are feeling neutral. This is because avoiding a shipping fee by making 
unplanned purchases increases the perceived efficiency of the transaction but fails to 
save money for more important expenses. Conversely, when consumers can avoid 
paying a shipping fee by delaying their purchase, we predict that both consumers who 
are anxious about running out of resources and consumers who are anxious about slow 
goal progress should be more likely to delay their purchase than neutral participants. In 
other words, relative to consumers in a neutral state, consumers anxious about slow goal 
progress should try to avoid the shipping fee regardless of whether or not this requires an 
unplanned purchase. Whereas consumers anxious about running out of resources should 
be more likely than neutral consumers to try to avoid the shipping fee only when doing 
so helps them save money, not when doing so requires making an unplanned purchase. 
 
Method 
 
Three hundred and seventy-eight undergraduate students (186 males) at a 
Southwestern university in the United States completed a study in exchange for course 
credit. The experiment had a 3 (anxiety from slow progress vs. anxiety from scarcity vs. 
neutral emotion) x 2 (free shipping facilitates only efficiency vs. free shipping facilitates 
both efficiency and conservation) between-subjects design.  
The study contained two parts disguised as unrelated studies. In the first part, 
participants engaged in a hypothetical shopping task. Participants imagined that they 
needed to buy a new pair of shoes and sunglasses. Next, they were directed to a screen 
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that simulated an online shopping website. They first viewed eight pairs of shoes costing 
$59.99 each, and chose one. They next viewed eight pairs of sunglasses costing $42.59 
each, and chose one. After making their choice, participants were told that the shopping 
software needed some time to prepare their shopping carts. In the meantime, they were 
instructed to take the next study.  
In the second study, we randomly assigned participants to an emotion condition. 
As in the previous studies, participants completed an essay-writing task. In both anxiety 
conditions, participants wrote about a goal that was causing them to feel anxious. In the 
slow goal progress condition, participants wrote about goals on which they were making 
slower than desirable progress (Most individuals have a lot to be anxious about–exams, 
jobs, maintaining healthy weight, getting enough sleep, and other life goals which they 
have trouble attaining. Think of a couple of such goals that you're anxious about not 
attaining. Think specifically about the plans that you had made to reach these goals, and 
compare that with the progress you have made. Have you been making progress as fast 
as you'd intended?). In the scarcity condition, participants wrote about whether or not 
they had sufficient time to successfully reach their goal (Most individuals have a lot to 
be anxious about–exams, jobs, maintaining healthy weight, getting enough sleep, and 
other life goals which they have trouble attaining. Think of a couple of such goals that 
you're anxious about not attaining. Think specifically about how much time there is left 
for you to reach these goals, and the activities you need to do to reach these goals. Have 
you got enough time left to do all the activities you had planned?). Similar to the 
previous studies, participants in the neutral emotion condition wrote about the different 
 41 
 
sources they get information from, such as library services, internet articles, etc. Note 
that our anxiety manipulation specifically asked participants about pursuits on which 
they were anxious about running out time. Thus, the manipulation should induce anxiety 
about a resource (time) that is unrelated to the resource (money) that consumers needed 
to allocate in the choice task. This lets us explicitly test if the effect of feeling anxious 
about running out of time influences how consumers allocate a different type of 
resource: money.  
After completing the emotion manipulation, participants returned to their 
shopping carts, which indicated that they had bought a pair of shoes worth $59.99 and a 
pair of sunglasses worth $42.59 for a total cost of $102.98. Also, because their cart total 
exceeded $100, participants were told that they qualified for free shipping. However, in 
a subsequent update, they were told that the sunglasses in their cart were out of stock, 
and, therefore, their new cart total was $59.99. Because the new total was below $100, 
they were informed that they did not qualify for free shipping any more. Participants 
were then offered a choice.  
When free shipping only facilitated efficiency, participants were offered a choice 
between paying $15 for shipping or purchasing an additional $40 gift card for university 
merchandise in order to qualify for free shipping. Because the gift card allowed 
participants to avoid shipping costs, it facilitated efficiency. But, because the gift card is 
more expensive than the $15 shipping fee, and because it is unplanned, buying it does 
not help participants save money. Analogously, when free shipping facilitated both 
efficiency and resource conservation, participants were offered a choice between placing 
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the order for just the shoes and paying $15 for shipping, or alternatively placing the 
order for both the shoes and the sunglasses, and waiting for a month to receive both of 
the products. By placing the order for both the shoes and the sunglasses, participants 
were able to avoid paying the shipping fee (i.e., $15). Thus, qualifying for free shipping 
by waiting for a month to receive the products allowed participants to both seek 
efficiency and save money.   
 
Pretests 
 
We tested the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation by asking participants 
(N = 85) to indicate how anxious, worried, nervous, negative and sad they felt on a 9-
point scales (1= not at all, 9 = very much) after completing the emotion manipulation. 
Ratings for “anxious”, “nervous”, and “worried” were averaged to form a composite 
score for anxiety (standardized α = .941), while ratings for “negative”, and “sad” 
(standardized α = .852) were averaged to form a composite score for overall negativity.  
To examine the effects of emotions on the composite score of anxiety, we 
conducted a three condition (anxiety from slow progress, anxiety from scarcity, neutral 
emotion) between-subjects ANOVA. The results revealed the predicted main effect of 
emotion (F(2, 82) = 12.61, p < .0001). Specifically, neutral participants (M = 1.844) 
were less anxious than participants who were anxious about slow goal progress (M = 
3.580; F(1, 82) = 12.61, p < .001) and participants who were anxious about resource 
scarcity (M = 4.011; F(1, 82) = 22.75, p < .001). Moreover, participants who were 
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anxious about slow goal progress felt just as anxious as participants who were anxious 
about resource scarcity (F(1, 82) = .76, NS). Similarly, neutral participants (M = 1.719) 
felt less negative than participants who were anxious about slow goal progress (M = 
3.435; F(1, 82) = 11.08, p < .01) and participants who were anxious about resource 
scarcity (M = 3.467; F(1, 82) = 13.30, p < .001). Participants who were anxious about 
slow goal progress felt just as negative as participants who were anxious about resource 
scarcity (F(1, 82) = 0.00, NS). 
 
Results 
 
In line with our predictions, emotions had a significant effect on the choice of the 
option offering free shipping (Wald χ²(2) = 6.783, p = .038). However this main effect 
was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between the emotion manipulation 
and the type of behavior that the efficient option facilitated (Wald χ²(2) = 4.930, p = 
.085; see figure 2-3). In other words, the effect of emotion on the preference for free 
shipping depended on whether or not qualifying for free shipping helped participants 
save money.  
Conceptually replicating our previous studies, the data revealed that participants 
who were anxious about slow goal progress were more likely to select the option 
offering free shipping even when it required them to spend money on an additional, 
unplanned purchase. Specifically, when participants were given the choice to pay $15 
for shipping or alternatively to add an unplanned and discretionary gift-card that cost 
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$40 to qualify for free shipping, participants who were anxious about slow goal progress 
were more likely to buy the $40 gift card (69.64%) than participants who felt anxious 
about insufficient resources (51.56%, Wald χ²(1) = 4.01, p = .045) or felt neutral 
(50.72%; contrast: Wald χ²(1) = 4.51, p = .034). Because buying this gift card allowed 
participants to qualify for free shipping, it facilitated efficiency but also hurt 
participants’ monetary savings.  
Interestingly, and consistent with our predictions, the data revealed a different 
pattern when participants could qualify for free shipping by waiting a month, a choice 
that facilitated both efficiency and savings. When participants were given the choice to 
pay $15 for shipping to receive the shoes immediately or to wait for a month to avoid the 
shipping fee, both the participants who were anxious about slow goal progress (71.43%) 
and participants who were anxious about insufficient resources (79.66%) were more 
likely to choose to wait than participants who felt neutral (60.29%; contrast: Wald χ²(1) 
= 4.88, p = .027).  
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FIGURE 2-3 
STUDY 5: PREFERENCE FOR FREE SHIPPING 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The study tests an important boundary condition. Specifically, the effect of 
anxiety on efficiency seeking only occurs when anxious participants are focusing on 
slow goal progress rather than on running out of resources. Consistent with previous 
literature, we find that when individuals are anxious about running out of resources, they 
are more likely to conserve resources (Fernbach et al. 2015; Shah et al. 2015; Spiller 
2011). Furthermore, we also demonstrate that when anxiety activates the desire to seek 
efficiency, and to conserve resources, it is fungible, and effects decisions related to 
resources other than those that are causing anxiety. Writing an essay about not having 
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enough time to attain a goal influenced how participants chose to spend their money in 
an unrelated shopping decision.  
  
General Discussion 
 
Consumers spend their time and money differently when they are anxious about 
an approaching exam, work deadline, saving money for retirement or reaching any 
number of other goals. Across five experiments, we found that consumers who feel 
anxious about falling behind on one of their goals (i.e., active anxiety) allocate their time 
and their money more efficiently than both consumers who feel anxious about threats 
outside of their control (i.e., passive anxiety) and consumers in a neutral emotional state. 
Consumers who wrote about goals that make them anxious attempted to accomplish 
more in a set amount of time in subsequent decisions. Specifically, they were more 
likely to select activities that could be completed in less time than normal (study 3) and 
to complete multiple tasks at the same time rather than in succession (study 1). Actively 
anxious consumers similarly attempted to acquire more for a set amount of money in 
subsequent decisions. Specifically, they were more likely to select products that cost less 
money than normal (study 3), buy additional products to avoid paying a shipping fee 
(study 5), and consume a larger number of servings when paying a fixed price for all-
you-can-eat or drink than when paying separately for each serving (study 2). Actively 
anxious mTurk workers even attempted to obtain a more efficient trade-off between time 
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and money by being more likely to complete a study that paid less overall but that 
offered a higher per-minute pay rate (study 4). 
Importantly, consumers’ efforts to be more efficient often come at a cost. By 
increasing efficiency seeking, active anxiety can result in consumers losing sight off the 
larger picture by causing them to focus on getting a good deal rather than on conserving 
or prioritizing their resources (Fernbach et al. 2015; Thaler 1985). Relative to passively 
anxious and neutral participants, actively anxious participants tried to use their time 
more efficiently by multi-tasking, which caused them to perform worse on the task than 
when they completed the tasks sequentially (study 1). Actively anxious participants 
similarly tried to spend their money efficiently by planning to eat more pizza (study 2), 
drink more beverages (study 2), purchase more discounted products (study 3), and make 
an unplanned, unnecessary purchase (study 5); it is unlikely that any of these decisions 
would help them save money or reach their most important goals, whatever they may be. 
Our research has several important theoretical and practical implications. First, 
we contribute to the literature by demonstrating a new consequence associated with 
anxiety. When consumers are anxious about slow goal progress, they attempt to spend 
resources more efficiently. Thus, in addition to increasing the appraisals of uncertainty 
and lack of control (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Tiedens and Linton 2001), inhibition 
motivation (Carver 2006; Schmeichel and Inzlicht 2013), and the desire to seek security 
(Raghunathan and Pham 1999), anxiety can increase efficiency seeking. 
Another implication is that our research suggests that anxiety is not a 
unidimensional emotion, but can have different effects depending on whether a 
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consumer is anxious about something over which they have agency (i.e., active anxiety) 
or is beyond their control (i.e., passive anxiety). Specifically, feeling anxious about slow 
goal progress (e.g., an approaching deadline) prompts consumers to try to use their time 
and money more efficiently, but feeling anxious about external threats (e.g., terrorism) 
does not. Our research thus adds to recent work shows that the same emotional state can 
have different consequences, depending on why consumers experience the emotion. For 
example, being envious of a superior who deserves her good fortune (i.e., benign envy) 
results in a higher willingness to pay for products the superior owns, whereas being 
envious of an undeserving superior (i.e., malicious envy) results in a higher willingness 
to pay for products the superior doesn’t own (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and Pieters 
2011). Similarly, attributing pride to a specific behavior (e.g., I did well on the exam 
because I studied) is associated with higher levels of self-esteem, whereas attributing 
pride to a stable characteristic (e.g., I did well on the exam because I’m smart) is instead 
associated with higher levels of narcissism (Tracy and Robins 2007). Adding to this 
nascent literature, we show that active anxiety makes consumers try to use their time and 
money more efficiently but passive anxiety does not.  
Finally, our research suggests important implications for consumers who are 
struggling to reach their goals. Our work suggests that feeling anxious about slow goal 
progress may trigger counter-productive behavior, like attempting to perform multiple 
activities simultaneously rather than accurately, selecting tasks based on how quickly 
they can be completed rather than on how important they are, overeating at an open table 
buffet, or buying useless products simply because they are on sale. Warning consumers 
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about these risks associated with active anxiety is the first step towards helping them 
curb these maladaptive behaviors. Our research also highlights a potential risk of setting 
ambitious goals. Monitoring progress towards goals can result in consumers 
experiencing higher levels of anxiety when the progress isn’t going as well as planned. 
Although the anxiety from their goals may motivate them to catch up with their goals, it 
may also trigger less adaptive choices, like trying to read while driving or running up 
credit card debt on products discounted for Black Friday. 
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CHAPTER 3  
HOW ANGER AND ANXIETY INFLUENCE CHOICE IN  
SELF-CONTROL DILEMMAS  
Introduction 
 
Consumers regularly experience negative emotions, from anger and fear to 
anxiety and despair. Americans are increasingly angry and anxious about corrupt 
government officials, terrorist attacks, identity theft, and economic collapse (Chapman 
University Survey of American Fears 2016). In fact, 43 percent of Americans suffer 
from moderate to high stress on a daily basis (Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012). 
Fearmongering by politicians and the media has only exacerbated anger and anxiety. 
According to the Esquire/NBC News Survey (2016), 49% of Americans experience 
more anger than they used to when thinking of current events and the news related to the 
2016 presidential election. 
The increased emotional baggage that consumers now carry begs an important 
question: How do negative emotions such as anger or anxiety influence choice in self-
control dilemmas? Much of past literature suggests that negative emotions hurt self-
control. Distress and sadness increases overspending (Cryder et al. 2008) and the 
consumption of unhealthy foods (Andrade 2005; Fedorikhin and Patrick 2010; Garg, 
Wansink, and Inman 2007). Negative emotions also trigger self-defeating behavior and 
cause relapse into unhealthy habits, such as smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, 
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and drug abuse (Cooper et al. 1995; Tice and Baumeister 1997).  
Building on research suggesting that different emotions activate distinct needs 
(or goals) (Durante and Laran 2016; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Raghunathan and Pham 
1999; Salerno, Laran, and Janiszewski 2014; Tooby and Cosmides 1990) that consumers 
try to satisfy by choosing means that are the most instrumental (Huang and Bargh 2014; 
Van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2012; Van Osselaer et al. 2005), we show that negative 
emotions do not have as straight-forward an effect on self-control (viz. impairment) as 
has been commonly argued in the past. Rather, we argue and demonstrate that the effect 
of negative emotions on choice in self-control dilemmas depends on whether the benefits 
associated with a virtuous option are aligned with the needs activated by the negative 
emotion (i.e., the instrumentality of the virtuous option).  
Take, for example, a situation in which a consumer needs to save money, a goal 
that requires self-control. We argue that experiencing a negative emotion can either 
increase or decrease a consumer’s likelihood of saving, depending on whether the 
benefits associated with the act of saving seem more or less instrumental to the needs 
activated by the specific emotion. Anger, for example, makes consumers want to be 
dominant (Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross 2008), whereas anxiety makes them want to be 
secure (Raghunathan, Pham, and Corfman 2006). Saving in order to buy the biggest 
house on the block would be consistent with a need for dominance, whereas saving 
money to build an emergency fund would be consistent with a need for security. Because 
anger activates a need for dominance, we argue that angry consumers are less likely to 
exert self-control when the savings are to be put into an emergency fund (a security 
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benefit) than when they are to be put aside to buy the biggest house on the block (a 
dominance benefit). On the other hand, because anxiety activates a need for security, 
anxious consumers tend to be less likely to exert self-control when they are saving 
money to buy the big house than when they are saving for emergencies. 
Our research makes three important contributions. First, we contribute to our 
understanding of how negative emotions influence choices in self-control dilemmas. 
Specifically, we suggest that negative emotions impair self-control only when the 
benefits associated with the virtuous option are not instrumental to the needs activated 
by the negative emotion. Second, we suggest a new way of conceptualizing decisions in 
self-control dilemmas. Rather than viewing self-control as a choice between a gratifying 
option that provides an immediate benefit and a virtuous option that provides a long-
term benefit, we show that both short-term and long-term benefits can facilitate different 
higher-order needs, such as dominance and security. Therefore, knowing whether a 
consumer is likely to select a virtuous option in a self-control dilemma requires not only 
understanding consumers’ desire for immediate hedonic benefits (Baumeister 2002; 
Hoch and Loewenstein 1991), but also understanding consumers’ other temporarily 
accessible needs and whether or not selecting the virtuous option facilitates these needs. 
Third, we show that instrumental benefits only increase the choice of virtuous options in 
the present, not in the future. By showing that that effect of emotions on choice in self-
control dilemmas depends on the temporal distance to the behavior, we supplement an 
emerging line of work that helps explain how and when goal activation drives choice 
(Laran 2010; Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha 2008). 
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Choice in Self Control Dilemmas 
 
A self-control dilemma involves a choice between a virtuous option (e.g., 
studying) promising long-term benefits and a gratifying option (e.g., watching TV) 
offering immediate pleasure (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Tice and Baumeister 1997). 
Consistent with much of the literature, we use self-control to refer to the decision to 
select a virtuous option offering long-term benefits over an immediately pleasurable 
gratifying option (Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Eun Huh 2016). In contrast, self-control can 
alternatively refer to a resource (i.e., self-regulatory strength, or willpower) that 
consumers rely on to select the virtuous option in self-control dilemmas (Baumeister and 
Heatherton 1996). To be clear, we use self-control strictly to refer to the choice of a 
relatively virtuous option over a relatively gratifying option in a self-control dilemma. 
We contend that the literature, which has conceptualized self-control dilemmas 
as a trade-off between immediate pleasure and long-term benefits, overlooks critical 
components of the choice dilemma. While gratifying options provide short-term 
benefits, and virtuous options provide long-term benefits, these benefits can in-turn 
satisfy different higher order needs. Because consumers choose the option that is most 
instrumental to their needs, consumers should be more likely to show self-control when 
the virtuous option is more aligned with their activated needs than the gratifying option 
(Huang and Bargh 2014; Kruglanski et al. 2002; Van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2012). 
Therefore, we conceptualize choice in a self-control dilemma as a function of 
consumers’ active needs and the extent to which the gratifying and virtuous options are 
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instrumental to these needs (Van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2012). Formally, a consumer 
selects the virtuous option (V) in a self-control dilemma when the sum of the activation 
of his or her needs (N1, N2,… Nn) multiplied by the instrumentality of the virtuous 
option to satisfy each of these needs (VB1, VB2,… VBn) is greater than the sum of the 
activation of the consumer’s needs multiplied by the instrumentality of the gratifying 
option to satisfy each of these needs (GB1, GB2,… GBn; see figure 3-1): 
(1) n(Nn*VBn) > n(Nn*GBn) 
 
FIGURE 3-1 
NEEDS AND CHOICE IN SELF-CONTROL 
 
 
Consider the following example: John is deciding between buying an expensive 
pair of sunglasses (G) or saving money (V). The choice represents a typical self-control 
dilemma because John’s desire for immediate pleasure (i.e., a hedonic need, N1) 
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increases the likelihood of buying the sunglasses, as they would make John feel good 
now (i.e., GB1 > VB1). However, this discretionary purchase would also prevent him 
from saving money, which he could potentially use towards future needs. For instance, 
John could save for emergencies and satisfy a security need (N2) or save to buy the 
biggest house on the block and satisfy a dominance need (N3). Therefore, whether John 
decides to save money or buy the sunglasses depends not only on the strength of John’s 
hedonic need (N1), which should decrease self-control (because GB1 > VB1), but also the 
strength of his need for security (N2), the strength of his need for dominance (N3), and 
the extent to which John expects that financial savings, and sunglasses will make him 
feel better, more or less secure, and more or less dominant than saving money (i.e., the 
relative magnitude of GB1, VB1, GB2, VB2, GB3, and VB3).  
Viewing the effect of emotions on self-control through the lens of a goal-based 
model of choice, we can now examine how and when negative emotions influence self-
control. 
 
Different Emotions Activate Different Needs 
 
Emotions exert a large influence on judgments and decisions (Pham 2007). The 
effect of emotions can either be integral or incidental (Han, Lerner, and Keltner 2007). 
Our research focuses on incidental effects of emotions on self-control. Incidental effects 
refer to when an emotion elicited by a stimulus or experience influences unrelated 
judgments or decisions, such as when anxiety about an approaching flight alters what a 
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consumer decides to buy at the supermarket (Cavanaugh et al. 2007; Han et al. 2007). 
According to a functionalist theory of emotions (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 
Raghunathan and Pham 1999; Tooby and Cosmides 1990), incidental effects of 
emotions occur because emotions activate distinct needs that can influence subsequent 
judgments and decisions (Carver 2006; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Because negative 
emotions are aversive, consumers experiencing negative emotions want to feel better by 
regulating their negative feelings  (Ochsner and Gross 2005; Schmeichel and Inzlicht 
2013; Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister 2001). One way that consumers can fulfill this 
hedonic need is by selecting a gratifying option over a virtuous one (because GB1 > 
VB1). This is why sadness tends to increase the likelihood that a consumer eats 
unhealthy foods (Garg et al. 2007) and overspends on discretionary purchases (Cryder et 
al. 2008).  
Negative emotions, however, can activate other needs (e.g., N2, N3) in addition to 
hedonic pleasure (Tooby and Cosmides 1990). For instance, fear activates a need for 
self-protection (Griskevicius et al. 2009), disgust activates a need to avoid contaminants 
(Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley 2008), and sadness activates a need to avoid future losses 
(Salerno et al. 2014). Recent evidence suggests that such needs can in fact help 
individuals attain their long-term goals (i.e., GBn < VBn). Consequently, individuals 
often actively seek negative emotions to better deal with difficult situations. For 
instance, people prefer to be angry when entering confrontational contexts and prefer to 
be worried and afraid when attempting to avoid threats, such as failing on an exam 
(Tamir and Ford 2009; Tamir 2005; Tamir et al. 2008). These findings qualify prior 
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research on hedonic emotion regulation, which suggests that people in negative moods 
generally pursue behaviors that they think will improve their mood. But even though 
these findings suggest that negative emotions may not always hurt self-control, it is not 
well understood when negative emotions impair self-control and when they don’t. With 
a few notable exceptions (Salerno et al. 2014), this question remains unanswered.  
A goal-based model of self-control offers a promising framework for predicting 
how negative emotions influence choices in self-control dilemmas. First, a goal-based 
model predicts that just as increasing the strength of a hedonic need decreases self-
control (Ochsner and Gross 2005; Tice et al. 2001), increasing the strength of a need that 
is more strongly associated with the virtuous option can enhance self-control. For 
example, priming a need to avoid future losses, which the virtuous option satisfies more 
than the gratifying option, improves self-control among sad consumers (Salerno et al. 
2014).  
A goal-based model also points to a new prediction: increasing the 
instrumentality of the virtuous option (i.e., increasing VBn), or decreasing the 
instrumentality of the gratifying option (i.e., decreasing GBn), towards a need activated 
by the emotion should improve self-control. We next discuss how virtuous and 
gratifying options can be made more or less instrumental to the needs activated by two 
negative emotions, anxiety and anger. 
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Needs Activated by Anger and Anxiety 
 
Like other emotions, anxiety and anger evolved to help humans cope with 
problems of survival and reproductive success (Mauss et al. 2005). Anxiety occurs when 
people recognize a distant threat or the possibility of not reaching a goal. For example, 
an airline passenger might be anxious about the plane crashing, whereas a student might 
be anxious about not passing an exam. Anxiety alerts individuals to threats and potential 
goal failures (Schmeichel and Inzlicht 2013) and helps get them back on track by 
activating a need to seek security (Lench et al. 2014; Raghunathan et al. 2006). This 
need for security spills over to unrelated decisions by increasing the preference for 
options that offer greater safety and control (Raghunathan et al. 2006). 
Anger, on the other hand, is experienced when the pursuit of a reward is 
disrupted due to wrongful interference (Chow, Tiedens, and Govan 2008; Kashdan et al. 
2015). For example, a student might be angry about an unfair exam question, a consumer 
might be angry about being charged a higher price than others, and a worker might be 
angry about not receiving an expected raise. The situations that trigger anger present an 
obstacle that individuals want to overcome. Unlike the situations that cause anxiety, the 
situations that cause anger are also perceived as unfair, undeserved, and caused by unjust 
actions of other individuals or institutions (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996). Overcoming 
these obstacles requires the exertion of dominance, which refers to the ability to acquire 
rewards or valued resources in the presence of others (Emerson 1962). Consistently, 
research shows that individuals prefer to seek anger in confrontational situations (Tamir 
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et al. 2008). Relatedly, anger tends to increase sensitivity to rewards but not sensitivity 
to threats (Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009), and dominance offers a better means of 
acquiring rewards than of reducing threats.  
In sum, the literature predicts that negative emotions, including anger and 
anxiety, increases a hedonic need. We predict that in addition to increasing a hedonic 
need, anxiety will increase a need for security whereas anger will increase a need for 
dominance (see figure 3-2).  
 
FIGURE 3-2 
EMOTIONS AND CHOICE IN SELF-CONTROL 
 
 
By integrating predictions about the distinct needs activated by anxiety and anger 
with a goal based choice model, we make three new predictions. One, consumers should 
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be more likely to choose the virtuous option when the benefits of the virtuous option in a 
self-control dilemma are more instrumental to the need activated by the consumers’ 
emotional state. Because anxiety activates a security need, we hypothesize that anxious 
consumers should be more likely to exert self-control when the virtuous option (e.g., 
studying) in a self-control dilemma is associated with a security (e.g., getting a secure 
job) rather than a dominance benefit (e.g., getting a prestigious job). On the other hand, 
because anger activates a dominance need, angry consumers should be more likely to 
exert self-control when the virtuous option is associated with a dominance rather than a 
security benefit.  
H1: Emotional consumers are more likely to show self-control when the virtuous 
option in the choice set is more instrumental to the needs activated by the consumers’ 
emotional state (see figure 3-3). 
 
Two, just as self-control can be improved when the benefit of the virtuous option 
is instrumental towards consumers’ active needs, it can also be impaired when the 
benefit of the gratifying option is instrumental towards the active needs. Consider a 
consumer who is trying to save money and is confronted with an opportunity to purchase 
an additional pair of sunglasses. In addition to offering a hedonic benefit, the gratifying 
purchase of the sunglasses could also potentially satisfy a need for security (e.g., UV ray 
protection), or a need for dominance (e.g., if the brand signals status and prestige). 
Consequently, we hypothesize that anxious consumers should be less likely to exert self-
control when the gratifying option is associated with security rather than dominance 
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benefits, whereas angry consumers should be less likely to exert self-control when the 
gratifying option is associated with dominance rather than security benefits.  
H2: Emotional consumers are less likely to show self-control when the gratifying 
option in the choice set is more instrumental to the needs activated by the consumers’ 
emotional state (see figure 3-3). 
Our third prediction identifies a boundary condition for when the instrumentality 
of the virtuous and gratifying options are likely to drive choice in self-control dilemmas. 
Increasing the activation of a need increases the selection of the instrumental option in 
common or typical contexts (e.g., Chartrand et al. 2008), but it is less likely to increase 
the selection of the instrumental option in uncommon or atypical contexts (Laran et al. 
2008). For example, participants primed with a hedonic need were more likely to select a 
fun gift over a sophisticated gift when the gift was for the participant’s father (a common 
choice context) but less likely to select the fun gift for a friend’s father (an uncommon 
choice context; Laran et al., 2008). An important factor influencing the typicality of a 
choice context is whether the decision concerns the present (or near future) or concerns 
the distant future ( Laran 2010; Laran et al. 2008). Choosing where to dine tonight is 
more common than choosing where to dine in a month, just as deciding how much 
money to save this month is more common than deciding how much money to save in 
the same month next year. Consequently, since choices concerning the distant future are 
less typical, active needs are more likely to influence decisions about what to do now 
than decisions about what to do in the distant future (Carlson, Meloy, and Miller 2013; 
Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Laran 2010; Laran et al. 2008).  
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It follows that the needs activated by emotions should have a larger effect on 
self-control decisions concerning the present (e.g., saving vs. spending money now) than 
those concerning the future (e.g., saving vs. spending money next year). Consequently, 
we predict that temporal distance will moderate the effect of instrumentality on choice in 
self-control dilemmas. That is, anxiety should increase the choice of a virtuous option 
offering a security rather than a dominance benefit when deciding what to do now, but 
not when deciding what to do in the distant future. Analogously, anger should increase 
the choice of a virtuous option offering a dominance rather than a security benefit when 
deciding what to do now, but not when deciding what to do in the distant future. 
H3: Temporal distance moderates the effect of instrumentality on self-control 
(see figure 3-3). 
 
FIGURE 3-3 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
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Study 1 
 
Our core argument is that increasing the instrumentality of the virtuous option 
towards the needs activated by anger and anxiety can increase self-control among angry 
and anxious individuals. Study 1 manipulates anxiety and anger, which we predict will 
activate the needs for security (N2) and dominance (N3), respectively. Study 1 
additionally manipulates the instrumentality of the virtuous option (i.e., studying for a 
job interview) by varying whether studying benefits security (i.e., VB2 is high) or 
dominance (i.e., VB3 is high). The study thus tests H1 by exploring if anxiety is less 
likely to impair self-control when studying is described as a means of getting a secure 
rather than a prestigious job (i.e., when VB2 is increased), but if anger is less likely to 
impair self-control when studying is described as a means of getting a prestigious rather 
than a secure job (i.e., when VB3 is increased).  
 
Method 
 
One hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students at a Southwestern university 
in the United States completed the study in return for course credit. For this and 
subsequent studies we made an a priori decision to filter out respondents who had 
previously completed all or part of the study beforehand (see appendix D for detailed 
filtering criteria). The sample sizes reported in each of the studies are the final samples 
after removing participants who did not qualify. The study had a 3 (emotion: anxiety vs. 
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anger vs. neutral) x 2 (benefit: security vs. dominance) between-subjects design.  
The study contained two parts described as unrelated studies. In the first part, 
participants were randomly assigned to an emotion condition. Depending on their 
randomly assigned emotion condition, participants wrote essays about events that make 
them feel anxious, events that make them feel angry, or activities that they had done that 
day (neutral condition), under the pretext that the study was designed to examine 
students’ lives (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Winterich and Haws 2011). Participants were 
first asked to write about three to five experiences or events that make them anxious 
(anxiety condition), three to five experiences or events that make them angry (anger 
condition), or three to five activities that they had done that day (neutral condition). 
Participants subsequently described the experience, event, or activity that makes them 
the most anxious, the most angry, or that they completed the most recently (neutral 
condition).  
As an ostensibly separate study, participants next selected an article to read. They 
had a choice between reading a relatively virtuous technical article on how to improve 
their performance in job interviews or reading a relatively gratifying article that 
contained comedic banter and humorous cartoons (see appendix F for the stimuli). 
Furthermore, we varied whether the virtuous option (i.e., the job interview article) was 
associated with a security benefit (A good job provides you a great deal of safety and 
security. People with good jobs are less likely to be laid off during turbulent times and 
are more protected from social, physical, and financial problems that afflict people who 
don’t have a good job), or a dominance benefit (A good job allows you to exercise a 
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great deal of influence and power. People with good jobs get to make important 
strategic decisions at work and acquire far more wealth and status than people who 
don’t have a good job).  
We measured self-control using a binary choice between reading the job 
interview article (coded as 1) and the entertaining article (coded as 0). After reading their 
selected article, participants indicated if and when they were planning to start looking for 
jobs (1 = I will start looking for a job/internship before the end of this semester; 2 = I 
will start looking for a job/internship before the end of this semester … 6 = I will start 
looking for a job/internship in the next spring (2018) semester; 7 = I do not plan to look 
for a job/internship; 8 = I already have a job/internship), their gender, and whether or not 
they had previously completed any of the parts of the study. Because the choice between 
the job interview article and the entertainment article poses a self-control dilemma only 
for participants who are looking for a job, we filtered out participants who said that they 
weren’t looking for a job (i.e., those who indicated that they already have a job, or are 
not planning to seek a job; 29.5% of the sample). We report the results with the full 
sample in appendix E. 
  
Pretests 
 
We conducted pretests with independent samples both to confirm that 
participants experienced the choice as a self-control dilemma and that the writing task 
effectively manipulated participants’ emotions. To test the articles in the choice set, we 
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asked participants (N = 27) to indicate when they thought they would receive the 
benefits of “reading an article that helps prepare for job or internship interview”, and 
“reading an entertaining article” on a 6-point scale (1 = Right away, 2 = Within a week, 
3 = In a few weeks, 4 = In a few months, 5 = In a year, 6 = After a few years). They 
were also asked to indicate the self-control required for “reading an article that helps 
prepare for job or internship interview”, and for “reading an entertaining article” on a 5-
point scale (1= None, 5 = A lot). As expected, “reading an article that helps prepare for 
job or internship interview” was associated with longer term benefits (M = 2.81) than 
“reading an entertaining article” (M = 1.37, p < .001) and was perceived to require 
greater self-control (M = 2.30) than “reading an entertaining article” (M = 1.44, p < 
.001). 
We also tested the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation by asking 
participants (N = 181) to indicate how anxious, worried, nervous, angry, frustrated, sad 
and negative they felt on a 9-point scales (1= not at all, 9 = very much) after completing 
the emotion manipulation. Ratings for “anxious”, “worried”, and “nervous” were 
averaged to form a composite score for anxiety (standardized α = .89), while ratings for 
“angry” and “frustrated” were averaged to form a composite score for anger (r = .80). 
Ratings for “negative”, and “sad” were averaged to form a composite score for 
negativity (r = .66).  
To examine the effects of emotions on the ratings of anger and anxiety, we 
conducted a 2 (ratings: anger, anxiety) × 3 (emotion: anger, anxiety, neutral) repeated-
measures ANOVA using ratings as a within-subjects factor and emotion as a between-
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subjects factor. The results revealed the predicted interaction between ratings and 
emotion (F(2, 178) = 13.52, p < .001). Specifically, angry participants (M = 3.21) were 
more angry than anxious (M = 2.65; F(1, 178) = 4.10, p < .05) and neutral participants 
(M = 1.83; F(1, 178) = 23.36, p < .0001). On the other hand, anxious participants (M = 
3.72) were more anxious than angry (M = 3.02; F(1, 178) = 7.32, p <.01) and neutral 
participants (M = 2.80; F(1, 178) = 12.48, p <.001). Finally, a between-subjects 
(emotion: anger, anxiety, neutral) ANOVA revealed that emotion condition also 
influenced overall negativity (F(2, 178) = 4.04, p < .05). Participants in the neutral 
condition felt significantly less negative (Mneutral = 1.97) than those in the anxiety 
condition (Manxiety = 2.64; F(1, 178) = 6.60, p < .05) and anger condition (Manger = 2.60; 
F(1, 178) = 5.64, p < .05). Participants in anger and anxiety condition did not differ in 
negativity (F(1, 178) = 0.03, NS).  
 
Results 
 
To test the effects of emotions on self-control, we conducted a 3 (Emotion: 
anger, anxiety, and neutral) × 2 (Benefit: security, dominance) between-subjects logistic 
regression. The effect of the emotion manipulation on self-control depended on whether 
participants read that jobs provide dominance or that jobs provide security (two-way 
interaction: Wald χ²(2) = 8.917; p = .012; see figure 3-4). In line with our prediction, 
emotions increased self-control when jobs were associated with a more instrumental 
benefit rather than a less instrumental benefit. Specifically, angry participants were 
marginally more likely to choose the job-interview article over the entertaining article 
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when jobs were described as a path to greater influence (78%) rather than security (50%, 
Wald χ²(1) = 3.434; p = .064). Conversely, anxious participants were marginally more 
likely to choose the job interview article over the entertaining article when jobs were 
described as a path to security (69%) rather than influence (41%, Wald χ²(1) = 3.769; p = 
.052). Participants in the neutral condition, also exhibited marginally less self-control 
when jobs were described as a means to dominance (45%) rather than security (72%, 
Wald χ²(1) = 3.275; p = .070). We are hesitant to interpret the marginally significant 
effect of the benefit manipulation in the neutral emotion condition both because we did 
not predict this effect and because we do not observe a similar pattern in subsequent 
studies.  
 
FIGURE 3-4 
STUDY 1: LIKELIHOOD TO READ THE VIRTUOUS ARTICLE 
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Discussion 
 
Study 1 shows that individuals exert more self-control when the virtuous option 
is more instrumental, and therefore, offers a benefit that is consistent, rather than 
inconsistent, with the need activated by the participant’s emotional state. Specifically, 
anxiety led to a higher likelihood of reading a relatively virtuous job interview article 
when jobs were described as providing security rather than dominance. Conversely, 
anger increased the likelihood of reading the job interview article when jobs were 
described as providing dominance rather than security. By using a real self-control 
dilemma relevant to the student participants (i.e., reading a virtuous article related to job-
interviews vs. an enjoyable article with cartoons), the study offers initial evidence that 
the effects of anger and anxiety on self-control depend on the benefits of the virtuous 
option in the choice set. The study, however, did not directly assess whether the needs 
for security and dominance mediated the observed effects. We test this hypothesized 
mediating process in studies 2a and 2b. 
  
Study 2 
 
Studies 2a and 2b use a causal-chain approach (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005) 
to provide evidence of the mediating process. Study 2a uses a lexical decision to assess 
whether anxiety activates a need for security (N2) and whether anger activates a need for 
dominance (N3). The task measures participants’ response time to sentences related to 
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security (e.g., “Seek shelter during tornadoes”) and dominance (e.g., “The captain gave 
orders”). The greater the activation of the need, the faster the participants’ ability to 
identify sentences associated with that need (Belei et al. 2012; Fishbach, Friedman, and 
Kruglanski 2003). Thus, we predicted that anxious participants would identify sentences 
related to security faster than participants who aren’t anxious, but that angry participants 
would identify sentences related to dominance faster than participants who aren’t angry. 
Study 2b tested the next part of the process by directly priming the need for 
security (N2) or dominance (N3) while orthogonally manipulating whether the virtuous 
option benefits security (VB2) or dominance (VB3) to explore whether self-control is 
higher when the benefits associated with the virtuous option match the consumer’s 
active need (i.e., when the instrumentality of the virtuous option is higher). We predicted 
that individuals primed with dominance would be more likely to exert self-control when 
the virtuous option provides a dominance benefit rather than a security benefit. On the 
other hand, we predicted that individuals primed with security would be more likely to 
exert self-control when the virtuous option provides a security benefit rather than a 
dominance benefit. 
 
Study 2a: Method 
 
Two hundred twenty undergraduate students at a Southwestern university in the 
United States completed the study for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions (“anger,” “anxiety,” or “neutral” emotion) in which they 
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performed the same writing task as in Study 1. After the writing task, participants 
completed an ostensibly unrelated study, which required them to respond to a lexical 
decision task. In this task, participants saw a fixation cross for one second before 
viewing a string of four words on the computer screen. Participants needed to indicate 
whether the string of words was a legitimate English sentence (by pressing the “Q” key) 
or not (by pressing the “P” key) as quickly and accurately as possible. Participants 
viewed four word sets in a practice round and eighteen word sets in the focal round. In 
the focal round, participants saw nine illegitimate sentences (e.g., “Not machine working 
is”), five legitimate sentences unrelated to dominance or security (e.g., “They organized 
the event”), two legitimate sentences related to security (“Seek shelter during tornadoes” 
and “Try to comfort her”), and two legitimate sentences related to dominance (“She 
dominates the tournament” and “The captain gave orders”) in random order. Response 
times were recorded in milliseconds. Following standard practice, we used only the 
correct responses and removed responses that had latencies more than three standard 
deviations away from the means (Belei et al. 2012; Fazio 1990). We averaged and log-
transformed the response times for security, dominance, and neutral sentences for the 
statistical analyses to normalize the distribution of the reaction time data (Whelan 2008); 
however, we report the untransformed response-times for ease of interpretation.  
 
Study 2a: Pretest 
 
We conducted a pretest to confirm that security related sentences were indeed 
 79 
 
perceived to be more associated with security than dominance, while the dominance 
related sentences were perceived to be associated more with dominance than with 
security. To test the sentences, we asked participants (N = 90) to indicate how strongly 
they associated the sentence with “security” and “dominance” on a 5-point scale (1 = 
Absolutely Not, 2 = Mostly Not, 3 = Somewhat, 4 = Mostly Yes, 5 = Definitely Yes). As 
expected, sentences related to dominance were rated higher on dominance (M = 5.48) 
than sentences related to security (M = 2.11, t(89) = 20.00, p < .0001). Conversely, 
sentences related to security were rated higher on security (M = 4.31) than sentences 
related to dominance (M = 3.02, t(89) = 7.03, p < .0001).  
 
Study 2a: Results  
 
To test the effects of emotions on response times, we conducted a 2 (sentence 
type: security, dominance; within-subjects) × 3 (emotion: anger, anxiety, control; 
between-subjects) repeated-measures ANOVA. We controlled for participants’ average 
response times on neutral sentences as a proxy for their baseline response speeds (Touré-
Tillery and Fishbach 2012). 
 The results revealed a significant interaction between sentence type and emotion 
(F(2, 216) = 4.09, p = .018; see figure 3-5). Specifically, angry participants were faster at 
responding to dominance related sentences (M = 1411.73 milliseconds) than participants 
in the neutral condition (M = 1553.06 miliseconds; F(1, 216) = 6.19, p = .014) and 
marginally faster than participants in the anxiety condition (M = 1501.99 milliseconds; 
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F(1, 216) = 2.93, p = .088). On the other hand, anxious participants were faster at 
responding to security related sentences (M = 1485.51 milliseconds) than participants in 
the neutral condition (M = 1622.72 milliseconds; F(1, 216) = 5.33, p = .022) and 
marginally faster than participants in the anger condition (M = 1579.21 milliseconds; 
F(1, 216) = 2.72, p = .100). The results confirm that anger increases the accessibility of 
dominance whereas anxiety increases the accessibility of security.  
 
FIGURE 3-5 
STUDY 2A: RESPONSE TIME IN THE LEXICAL DECISION TASK 
 
Study 2b: Method 
 
One hundred seventy-nine undergraduate students at a Southwestern university in the 
United States participated in the study for credits. The experiment had a 2 (activated 
need: dominance vs. security) x 3 (benefit: security vs. dominance vs. neutral) between-
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subject design. The study contained two parts disguised as unrelated studies. In the first 
part, participants were randomly assigned to a need condition. We used the scrambled 
sentence task, an established priming technique, to activate security and dominance 
needs (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). The task required participants to unscramble a string 
of five words to create a grammatically correct English sentence. In each condition 
participants saw twenty sets of words. In the dominance condition, eight of the twenty 
sets could be successfully unscrambled to form a sentence related to dominance (e.g., 
“Captain gave the orders”). In the security condition, eight of the twenty sets could be 
successfully unscrambled to form a sentence related to security (e.g., “Seek shelter 
during tornadoes”) (see appendix F). The remaining twelve sets in each of the conditions 
could be unscrambled to form a neutral sentence. These twelve sentences were neutral 
fillers and were included to reduce suspicion about the priming technique. After 
completing the scrambled-sentence task, participants completed an ostensibly separate 
study on reading preferences. As in study 1, participants chose whether to read a 
technical article about job interviews or a more pleasurable article that contained 
comedic banter and humorous cartoons. Similar to study 1, participants read that landing 
a job benefits dominance, security, or neither, depending on the benefit condition (see 
appendix F for stimuli). In addition to the dominance and security benefit conditions 
described in study 1, we also included a neutral condition in which participants were 
simply told that good job allow individuals to lead a pleasant life. Finally, after reading 
their selected article, participants indicated whether they were looking for a job (1 = 
absolutely not; 7 = absolutely yes).  
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Study 2b: Pretest 
 
We conducted pretests to confirm that the security sentences were perceived to 
be more associated with security than dominance, while the dominance sentences were 
perceived to be more associated with dominance than security. The pretest asked 
participants (N = 90) to indicate how strongly they associated the sentence with 
“security” and “dominance” on a 5-point scale (1 = Absolutely Not, 2 = Mostly Not, 3 = 
Somewhat, 4 = Mostly Yes, 5 = Definitely Yes). We computed the average security and 
dominance ratings for security related sentences, dominance related sentences, and 
neutral sentences. As expected, sentences related to dominance were rated higher on 
dominance (M = 3.75) than sentences related to security (M = 2.02, t(89) = 17.02, p < 
.001) and neutral sentences (M = 1.58, t(89) = 25.39, p < .001). Conversely, sentences 
related to security were rated higher on security (M = 3.34) than sentences related to 
dominance (M = 2.86, t(89) = 4.68, p < .0001) and neutral sentences (M = 1.73, t(89) = 
18.44, p < .001).  
 
Study 2b: Results 
 
To test the effects of emotions on self-control, we conducted a 2 (need: security, 
dominance) × 3 (benefit: security, dominance, neutral) between-subjects logistic 
regression. In line with our predictions, the effect of the need manipulation on self-
control depended on whether jobs were associated with dominance or security (Wald 
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χ²(2) = 6.47; p = .039; see figure 3-6). Participants in the dominance condition were most 
likely to choose the job interview article over the entertaining article when jobs were 
described as a means to dominance (52.6%), next most likely in the neutral benefit 
condition (41.4%), and the least likely when jobs were described as a means to security 
(30.4%; Cochran-Armitage Trend Test Z(1) = 1.715; p = .043). Conversely, participants 
in the security condition were most likely to choose the job-interview article over the 
entertaining article when jobs were described as a means to security (46.9%), next most 
likely in the neutral benefit condition (37%), and the least likely when jobs were 
described as a means to dominance (23.3%; Cochran-Armitage Trend Test z(1) = -1.928; 
p = .027). In sum, need activation increased self-control when jobs were associated with 
a consistent benefit rather than an inconsistent benefit.  
 
FIGURE 3-6 
STUDY 2B: LIKELIHOOD TO READ THE VIRTUOUS ARTICLE 
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Discussion 
 
Collectively, studies 2a and 2b suggest that the effect of an emotion on self-
control depends on the instrumentality of the virtuous option in a self-control dilemma 
(H1) and that the specific needs activated by the emotion mediate this effect. Different 
emotions activate different needs (study 2a), which in turn increase self-control when the 
virtuous option benefits the activated need (study 2b). To provide further evidence for 
the process, in the next study we show that anger and anxiety not only enhance self-
control when there is a match between the activated need and the virtuous option, but 
also impair self-control when there is a match between the activated need and the 
gratifying option. 
 
Study 3 
 
Study 3 extends the previous studies by examining how the instrumentality of the 
gratifying option, rather than the instrumentality of the virtuous option, influences self-
control (H2). Because emotions increase the choice of the option that best facilitates the 
need activated by the emotion, choices in self-control dilemmas should depend not only 
on the instrumentality of the virtuous option but also the instrumentality of the gratifying 
option. Specifically, although anger should increase self-control when the virtuous 
option benefits dominance rather than security, anger should decrease self-control when 
the gratifying option benefits dominance rather than security. Analogously, anxiety 
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should increase self-control when the virtuous option benefits security rather than 
dominance but decrease self-control when the gratifying option benefits security rather 
than dominance. As in the previous studies, study 3 manipulates whether participants 
feel angry, anxious, or neither before asking them to make a decision in an unrelated 
self-control dilemma. Unlike the previous studies, study 3 assesses choice in a different 
type of self-control dilemma: saving vs. spending money on a discretionary purchase.  
 
Method 
 
Three hundred fourteen participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small payment. The experiment had 
a 3 (emotion: anxiety, anger, neutral) x 2 (benefit: security, dominance) x 2 
(instrumentality: gratifying option, virtuous option) between-subject design.  
The study included two parts disguised as unrelated studies. In part one, 
participants evaluated a brief video selected to elicit anxiety, anger, or neutral emotion, 
depending on randomly assigned condition. Participants in the anxiety condition viewed 
a video clip of a plane crash. The video was about the Air France flight 447 which 
crashed due to bad weather and contained a simulation of the chaos in the cock-pit, just 
moments before the crash. In the anger condition, participants viewed a video titled 
“Making the Bus Monitor Cry.” This video showed school children bullying an old lady. 
In the neutral emotion condition, participants viewed a video about animals from The 
National Geographic collection. Using a video to manipulate emotions lets us examine if 
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our effect generalizes across a range of different emotion manipulations.  
After seeing the video, participants completed a hypothetical choice task as part 
of an ostensibly separate study. Participants were asked to imagine that they had come 
across a pair of sunglasses at Ray-Ban's Store that they liked far better than the pair they 
currently own. They were then asked to make a choice between two gift cards: a gift 
card to Ray-Ban that would allow them to get the sunglasses they liked and a gift-card to 
the supermarket that would help them save money by paying for food and other essential 
items. 
We subsequently manipulated the benefit associated with either the virtuous or 
the gratifying option (see table 3-1 and appendix F). When the benefit was associated 
with the virtuous option, we described saving money either as leading to dominance 
(Research suggests that people who save more money appear more confident and 
powerful, and also command more attention and higher social status among their peers 
and friends) or security (Research suggests that people who save more money are better 
prepared for a range of unforeseen risks, are more secure, have fewer health issues and 
live longer). Conversely, when the benefit was associated with the gratifying option, we 
described the sunglasses either as benefiting dominance (The sunglasses have a 
reputation as the most prestigious brand on the market and are a top pick amongst 
sports and fashion celebrities and jet-setting CEOs alike) or security (The sunglasses 
have a reputation for offering the best protection from damaging UV-rays that can cause 
photokeratisis - a temporary but painful “sunburn” of the cornea - and are therefore 
highly recommended by eye doctors and pilots alike). We measured choice in the self-
 87 
 
control dilemma using a 5-point scale from 1 (“Definitely the gift card for the 
sunglasses”) to 5 (“Definitely the gift card for the supermarket”). Finally, participants 
completed several individual difference measures, including their attitudes towards Ray 
Ban sunglasses, gender, and age (full list of measures reported in online appendix G). 
 
TABLE 3-1  
STUDY 3: BENEFITS SPECIFIED ACROSS CONDITIONS 
Condition Benefit Associated with: 
Virtuous Option (Saving) Gratifying Option 
(Sunglasses) 
1. Dominance benefit 
offered by virtuous 
option 
People who save more 
money appear more 
confident and powerful 
No benefit mentioned  
2. Security benefit 
offered by virtuous 
option 
People who save more 
money are better prepared 
for a range of unforeseen 
risks 
No benefit mentioned  
3. Dominance benefit 
offered by gratifying 
option 
No benefit mentioned The sunglasses have a 
reputation as the most 
prestigious brand on the 
market 
4. Security benefit 
offered by gratifying 
option 
No benefit mentioned The sunglasses have a 
reputation for offering 
the best protection from 
damaging UV-rays 
 
 
 
Pretests 
 
We conducted a pretest with a separate sample (N = 65) to ensure that 
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participants perceived choosing the gift card for the supermarket as requiring more self-
control than the gift card for the sunglasses. Participants indicated the self-control 
required for “choosing the Ray-Ban gift-card” and “choosing the grocery gift-card” on a 
5-point scale (1= None, 5 = Very Much). As expected, choosing the grocery gift card 
was perceived to require greater self-control (M = 3.154 vs. 2.138, t(128) = 4.24, p < 
.001). 
We conducted an additional pretest (N = 54) to ensure that the videos effectively 
elicited anxiety, anger, and neither emotion, respectively. Participants viewed one of the 
three videos and subsequently indicated how anxious, worried, nervous, angry, furious, 
frustrated, sad and negative they felt on 9-point scales (1= Not at all, 9 = Very much). 
Ratings for “anxious,” “worried,” and “nervous” were averaged to form a composite 
score for anxiety (standardized α = .91). Ratings for “angry,” “frustrated,” and “furious” 
were averaged to form a composite score for anger (standardized α = .93). Ratings for 
“negative” and “sad” were averaged to form a composite score for negativity 
(correlation r =.77).  
To examine the effects of emotions on ratings of anger and anxiety, we 
conducted a 2 (measure: anger, anxiety; within-subjects) × 3 (video: anger, anxiety, 
neutral; between-subjects) repeated-measures ANOVA. The results confirmed that the 
videos elicited the expected emotional reactions. Specifically, there was a significant 
interaction (F(2, 51) = 38.28, p < .001), such that angry participants (M = 5.11) were 
more angry than anxious participants (M = 2.25; F(1, 51) = 51.17, p < .001) and neutral 
participants (M = 1.43; F(1, 51) = 69.75, p < .001), whereas anxious participants (M = 
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4.23) were more anxious than angry participants (M = 3.38; F(1, 51) = 4.69, p < .05) and 
neutral participants (M = 1.98; F(1, 51) = 27.21, p < .001). Moreover, a between-
subjects (video: anger, anxiety, neutral) ANOVA revealed that the video also influenced 
overall negativity (F(2, 51) = 23.47, p < .001). Participants in the neutral condition felt 
significantly less negative (Mneutral = 1.89) than those in the anxiety condition (Manxiety = 
3.28; F(1, 51) = 8.69, p < .01) and anger condition (Manger = 5.05; F(1, 51) = 45.37, p < 
.001). However, participants in anger condition also felt more negative than anxious 
participants (F(1, 51) = 17.41, p < .001). But, because the study only examines the 
contrast between security and dominance benefit conditions within the emotions 
condition (i.e., for either angry participants or for anxious participants), and not between 
emotion conditions (e.g., security benefit for angry participants versus security benefit 
for anxious participants) this concern does not affect our findings. Thus we do not 
discuss it further. 
 
Results 
 
To test how the alignment between the participants’ emotion and the benefits 
associated with the options in the choice set influences self-control, we conducted a 3 
(emotion: anxiety, anger, control) x 2 (benefit: security, dominance) x 2 (instrumentality: 
gratifying option, virtuous option) between-subject ANOVA. In line with our 
predictions, the effect of emotions on self-control depended on which gift-card was 
associated with an additional benefit as well as whether that benefit promised dominance 
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or security (three-way interaction: F(2, 301) = 6.72, p = .001; see figures 3-7 and 3-8). 
To interpret the interaction, we first examine the results when the benefits were 
associated with the virtuous option and then examine the results when the benefits were 
associated with the gratifying option. 
Conceptually replicating our previous studies, the data revealed that emotions 
increased self-control when the virtuous option was associated with a consistent benefit 
rather than an inconsistent benefit. Specifically, angry participants were marginally more 
likely to save when saving was linked to confidence and power (Mdominance = 4.63) rather 
than security (Msecurity = 4.04; F(1, 301) = 3.23, p =.073). On the other hand, anxious 
participants were more likely to save when saving was linked to security (Msecurity = 4.55) 
rather than power (Mdominance = 3.95, F(1, 301) = 4.98, p = .026). The benefit of saving 
money did not influence self-control for participants in the neutral emotion condition 
(Msecurity = 4.54 vs. Mdominance = 4.57, F(1, 301) = 0.01, NS). 
Interestingly, and consistent with hypothesis 2, the data revealed the opposite 
pattern when the benefits were associated with the gratifying option. Angry participants 
were directionally less likely to save when participants read that the sunglasses offered 
prestige (Mdominance-gratification = 4.12) rather than protection (Msecurity-gratification = 4.54; F(1, 
301) = 1.77, p = .184). On the other hand, anxious participants were significantly less 
likely to save when the sunglasses offered protection (Msecurity-gratification = 4.00) rather 
than prestige (Mdominance-gratification = 4.54; F(1, 301) = 4.36, p = .038). The benefit of 
purchasing the sunglasses did not influence self-control for participants in the neutral 
condition (Msecurity-gratification = 4.50 vs. Mdominance-gratification = 4.62, F(1, 301) = .16, NS). 
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FIGURE 3-7 
STUDY 3: SECURITY AND DOMINANCE BENEFITS OF THE VIRTUOUS 
OPTION 
 
 
FIGURE 3-8 
STUDY 3: SECURITY AND DOMINANCE BENEFITS OF THE GRATIFYING 
OPTION 
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Discussion 
 
Study 3 provides further evidence for a goal-based model of choice in self-
control dilemmas. First, the study replicated the previous studies by showing that 
negative emotions are less likely to impair self-control when the virtuous option is more 
instrumental to the need activated by the emotion (H1). The study also extended the 
previous studies by showing that negative emotions are more likely to impair self-
control when the gratifying option is more instrumental to the need activated by the 
emotion (H2). Because anger activates a need for dominance, angry consumers are more 
likely to show self-control when a virtuous option (e.g., saving) benefits dominance 
rather than security, but less likely to show self-control when a gratifying option (e.g., 
spending) benefits dominance. Analogously, because anxiety activates a need for 
security, anxious consumers are more likely to show self-control when a virtuous option 
(e.g., saving) benefits security rather than dominance, but less likely to show self-control 
when a gratifying option (e.g., spending) benefits security. 
 
Study 4 
 
The primary purpose of study 4 was to examine a boundary condition for the 
finding that self-control is higher when the benefits of a virtuous option are aligned with 
the needs activated by an emotion. The literature shows that consumers are less likely to 
select options instrumental to their active needs when deciding about the distant future 
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(e.g., saving money a year from now) rather than the present (e.g., saving money today; 
Carlson et al. 2013; Laran 2010). Consequently, in this study, we examined if temporal 
distance to the self-control behavior moderates the effect of emotions on self-control. 
Specifically, we predicted that angry consumers would be more likely to select a 
virtuous option that benefits dominance in decisions about the present than in decisions 
about the distant future. Similarly, we predicted that anxious consumers would be more 
likely to select a virtuous option that benefits security in decisions about the present than 
indecisions about the distant future. 
Study 4 also extended the previous studies in two additional ways. First, we 
examined whether the effects of emotions would extend to chronic individual differences 
in emotions in addition to temporarily activated emotions. Individuals vary in the 
emotions that they chronically experience (e.g., Coleman and Williams 2013). Some 
people are regularly anxious, others are regularly angry, and others are typically 
unemotional. Thus, whereas the previous studies attempted to situationally activate 
anger or anxiety, study 4 measured stable individual differences in the tendency to 
experience anger and anxiety. We also extended the previous studies by measuring the 
extent to which participants engage in a virtuous behavior (i.e., how much money they 
choose to save) rather than by measuring a dichotomous choice between a virtuous and a 
gratifying behavior (e.g., whether they choose to save or spend).  
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Method 
 
Eight hundred sixty-four participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk completed an online survey in return for a small payment. The survey randomly 
assigned participants to a condition in a 3 (benefit: security vs. dominance vs. neutral) x 
2 (temporal distance to self-control behavior: present vs. future) between-subjects 
experiment while measuring individual differences in dispositional anger and 
dispositional anxiety. Our hypotheses predict differences in the contrast between security 
and dominance benefits. We expect that the effect of neutral benefits on self-control may 
lie somewhere between security and dominance, but we do not make any formal 
conditions for the neutral benefits condition. 
  The study had two parts disguised as unrelated studies. The first part, described 
as a study on financial decision-making, informed participants that an organization 
called the “Consumer Federation of America” was encouraging consumers to increase 
the amount of money they save each year. The organization claimed that one of the most 
effective ways to save money is to put some or all of one’s tax refund into a savings 
account. Participants subsequently read that the average American receives $1000 in tax 
refund and were asked how much they would be willing to put into their savings account 
if they were to receive a $1000 tax refund. To manipulate whether the decision to save 
money occurred now or in the future, participants in the present condition were told to 
imagine that they had just received $1000 in tax refund, whereas participants in the 
future condition were told to imagine they will be receiving $1000 in tax refund a year 
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from now. Furthermore, to manipulate the benefit associated with exerting self-control, 
the campaign described savings either as offering a security benefit (Remember, saving 
money can provide you a lot of security, and give you the ability to protect your family 
during emergencies), a dominance benefit (Remember, saving money can make you rich 
and powerful, and give you the ability to lead, or positively influence others), or neither 
(neutral benefit) (see appendix F).  
As an ostensibly separate study, participants next read that the researchers were 
interested in understanding the relation between demographic factors such as age and 
gender, and personality. As part of the study, they completed a scale measuring trait 
anxiety (e.g., "I feel difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them;" Gambetti 
and Giusberti 2012; Spielberger and Sydeman 1994) and another scale measuring trait 
anger (e.g., "I get annoyed when I am singled out for correction;" Gambetti and 
Giusberti 2012; Spielberger and Sydeman 1994). The trait anxiety scale consisted of 
items that indicated the absence of anxiety (e.g., “I am content”, “I am happy”) aside 
from the items that indicated the presence of anxiety (e.g., “I feel difficulties are piling 
up so that I cannot overcome them”). Because items that measured an absence of anxiety 
were indicative of a general state of wellbeing and positivity, they could also indicate the 
absence of other trait negative emotions such as anger and sadness. Therefore, to 
calculate the measure of trait anxiety we only used items that represented the presence of 
anxiety. The order of the trait scales was counterbalanced. By using trait scales in this 
study, we further try to generalize our findings from state emotions to trait emotions. 
Because essay manipulations may directly prime information related to needs (e.g., 
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security and dominance) in addition to the intended emotions, using alternate 
manipulations, such as videos (study 3) and trait measures of emotions (study 4), helps 
establish that it is in fact the emotional experience that underlie our predicted effects.  
Finally after completing trait emotion scales, participants reported the extent to 
which they were currently trying to save money on a 5-point scale (1= absolutely not, 5 
= definitely yes) and their demographic information. Because the amount of money that 
participants choose to save in our experiment should depend on the extent to which they 
are actually trying to save money outside of the lab, we collected this measure to use as a 
covariate in the analysis. We report the results without the covariate in appendix E. 
 
Results   
 
To assess whether the instrumentality of saving money towards the need 
activated by anger and anxiety depends on whether the decision takes place immediately 
or in the distant future, we regressed the amount of the tax refund participants indicated 
they would save on the manipulated factors, the trait emotion measures, and their 
interactions. Specifically, we regressed the savings measure on two dummy-coded 
variables representing the benefit manipulation, one dummy-coded variable representing 
the temporal distance manipulation, the benefit-by-distance interaction, the mean-
centered score on the trait anger scale, the mean-centered score on the trait anxiety scale, 
and the two and three-way interactions between each trait emotion measure and the 
variables representing the benefit and distance manipulations, controlling for measure 
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order and the extent to which the participant was trying to save money outside of the 
study. As predicted, there were two significant three-way interactions (see table 3-2). 
Temporal distance moderated the interaction between the trait anger measure and the 
benefit manipulation (F(2, 844) = 3.27, p = .039) as well as the trait anxiety measure and 
the benefit manipulation (F(2, 844) = 3.22, p = .040; see figures 3-9 and 3-10). We used 
floodlight analysis and the Johnson-Neyman technique (Spiller et al. 2012) to examine 
the relationship between the trait emotion measures and savings in each of the 
conditions.  
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TABLE 3-2  
STUDY 4 RESULTS 
Independent Variables b 
Std 
Error 
F (df) p  
Intercept 
27.349
9 
1.285 42.56 
<.000
1 
Benefit       1.31 (2) .270 
Dominance (= 1) vs. Security (= 0)  0.9388 1.1668 0.64 .421 
Neutral (= 1) vs. Security (= 0) -0.9547 1.166 0.672 .413 
Temporal Distance (Future = 1, Present = 
0) 
-0.4189 0.9539 0.194 (1) .661 
Benefit x Temporal Distance     1.08 (2) .340 
Dominance vs. Security, Future vs. Present -1.3899 2.3334 -1.2 .552 
Neutral vs. Security, Future vs. Present -3.4178 2.3366 -2.92 .144 
Anger (standardized) -0.7195 0.5515 1.69 .192 
Anger (standardized)  x Benefit     0.2 (2) .822 
Dominance vs. Security 0.8839 1.8058 0.240 .625 
Neutral vs. Security -0.2748 1.7452 0.026 .875 
Anger (standardized)  x Temporal Distance   0.01 (1) .905 
Future vs. Present -0.5506 1.454 0.144 .705 
Anger (standardized)  x Benefit x 
Temporal Distance 
    3.27 (2) .039 
Dominance vs. Security, Future vs. Present -6.8319 2.7807 6.052 .014 
Neutral vs. Security, Future vs. Present -1.5681 2.6028 0.36 .547 
Anxiety (standardized) -0.1013 0.5558 0.032 (1) .856 
Anxiety (standardized)  x Benefit     2.74 (2) .065 
Dominance vs. Security -2.1432 1.7636 1.488 .225 
Neutral vs. Security -3.068 1.7502 3.063 .08 
Anxiety (standardized) x Temporal 
Distance 
  0.08 (1) .779 
Future vs. Present -0.11 1.4563 0.006 .940 
Anxiety (standardized)  x Benefit x 
Temporal Distance 
    3.22 (2) .040 
Dominance vs. Security, Future vs. Present 6.453 2.7244 5.617 .018 
Neutral vs. Security, Future vs. Present 5.0961 2.6242 3.764 .053 
Baseline Saving Goal (standardized) 6.9228 0.4815 28.76 <.001 
Scale Order (anger 1st = 1, anxiety 1st = 0) -0.5132 0.9535 -1.08  .591 
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When participants were deciding how much money to save right now, the results 
conceptually replicated our previous studies. The effects of anger (F(1,844) = 2.82, p = 
.093) and anxiety (F(1,844) = 10.95, p = .001) on savings were different in the 
dominance condition than in the security condition. Consistent with H1, participants who 
scored more than 0.913 standard deviation above average on the anger scale saved 
significantly more when savings benefited dominance (M = $ 600) rather than security 
(M = $506; F(1,844) = 3.85, p = .05; see the left column of figure 3-9). Furthermore, 
participants who scored more than 1.0675 standard deviations above average on the 
anxiety scale saved significantly more when savings benefited security (M = $620) 
rather than dominance (M = $518; F(1,844) = 3.85, p = .05). Also, participants who 
scored less than .298 standard deviations below average on the anxiety scale saved 
significantly less when savings benefited security (M = $527) rather than dominance (M 
= $597; F(1,844) = 3.85, p = .05) (see the left column of figure 3-10).   
On the other hand, however, when participants chose how much money to save 
in the future, a match between benefit instrumentality and the need activated by the 
emotion did not increase savings for either anger or anxiety. Consistent with H3, the 
effect of anger (F(1,844) = 3.23, p = .072) on savings was marginally different in the 
dominance condition and the security condition, but in the opposite direction as findings 
from the present condition (see the right column of figure 3-9). However, there were not 
any Johnson-Neyman points (at p = .05) within the range of anger scores in the sample. 
Also, unlike in the present condition but consistent with H3, the effect of anxiety on 
savings was not different in the security and dominance conditions (F(1,844) = 0.01, 
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NS) (see the right columns in figures 3-10). 
 
FIGURE 3-9 
STUDY 4: EFFECT OF TRAIT ANGER ON SAVING MONEY 
 
 
FIGURE 3-10 
STUDY 4: EFFECT OF TRAIT ANXIETY ON SAVING MONEY 
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Discussion 
 
Study 4 provides further support for our predictions while establishing an 
important boundary condition. Specifically, the study found that higher scores on a trait 
emotion measure increased self-control when a virtuous option (saving money) provided 
a consistent benefit, but only for decisions about the present. When participants decided 
how much money to save in the future, the instrumentality of saving towards the needs 
activated by anger and anxiety (dominance and security, respectively) failed to improve 
self-control. These findings may explain why the effects of emotions on self-control are 
often weak (Lench et al. 2014). Choices in self-control dilemmas are likely to reflect 
weak effects if the temporal distance to the behavior, or the atypicality of the context 
more generally, is not accounted for (Laran 2010; Laran et al. 2008). Finally, this study 
affirms the robustness of our predictions across different ways of operationalizing 
emotions and self-control. First, we show that our findings extend beyond state emotions 
(e.g., emotions primed through videos and essays) to trait emotions as well. Second, we 
show that the effect of need instrumentality influences not only the choice between a 
gratifying and a virtuous option, but also influences the extent to which a consumer 
pursues a virtuous behavior.   
 
General Discussion 
 
One concern with the trend towards society becoming increasingly anxious and 
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angry is that negative emotions could impair consumers’ self-control, which would lead 
to even more intense feelings of anger and anxiety, not to mention disappointment and 
regret. Our studies, however, illustrate that the effects of negative emotions on decisions 
in self-control dilemmas are more complicated and nuanced than generally believed. 
Rather than unilaterally impairing self-control, the effect of negative emotions on choice 
in self-control dilemmas depends on the consumer’s active needs, as well as the 
instrumentality of the gratifying and the virtuous options towards those needs. Although 
the need for hedonic pleasure tends to reduce self-control (Tice et al. 2001), other needs 
elicited by a negative emotion may enhance or impair self-control, depending on 
whether or not the specific benefits of the virtuous and the gratifying options in the 
choice set are instrumental to those needs. Anxiety, which activates a need for security, 
increases self-control more when the virtuous option in a self-control dilemma provides 
a security benefit than when it provides a dominance benefit. Anger, on the other hand, 
activates a dominance need and is consequently more likely to increase self-control 
when the virtuous option provides a dominance benefit than when it provides a security 
benefit. Study 1, for example, shows that anxious students are more likely to read a 
virtuous article if it helps them get a secure job than if it helps them get a prestigious job. 
Angry students, on the other hand, are more likely to read the article if it will help them 
get a prestigious job than if it will help them get a secure job.  
 Studies 2, 3, and 4 provide evidence of the process and boundary conditions for 
this effect. Study 2 demonstrates that anxiety activates a security need, while anger 
activates a dominance need. In turn, these activated needs increase self-control when the 
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benefit of the virtuous option is consistent with the need. Study 3 shows that just as 
increasing the instrumentality of the virtuous option improves self-control, increasing the 
instrumentality of the gratifying option impairs self-control. Specifically, anxiety 
enhances self-control when the virtuous option offers a security rather than a dominance 
benefit, but also impairs self-control when the gratifying options offers a security rather 
than dominance benefit. Similarly, anger enhances self-control when the virtuous option 
offers a dominance rather than a security benefit, but also impairs self-control when the 
gratifying options offers a dominance rather than a security benefit. Finally, study 4 
demonstrates an important boundary condition. Need instrumentality guides decisions 
about the present but not decisions about the distant future. Specifically, for immediate 
decisions, anxiety enhances self-control when the virtuous option benefits security rather 
than dominance and anger enhances self-control when the virtuous option benefits 
dominance rather than security. However, this effect does not extend to decisions about 
the distant future. 
 
Implications 
 
Our findings highlight that self-control cannot be simply conceptualized as a 
tradeoff between immediate benefits and long-term benefits. The benefits provided by 
the virtuous option are realized in the future (e.g., studying helps students land a future 
job), but they also facilitate specific higher-order needs, such as security (e.g., finding a 
stable and secure job) and dominance (e.g., finding a prestigious and influential job). 
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Therefore, understanding the effects of contexts (e.g., emotions) that activate needs, on 
self-control, requires identifying the specific needs that the context activates and whether 
or not these needs are consistent with the perceived benefit of the virtuous and gratifying 
options in the self-control dilemma. 
Our findings also have implications for emotional consumers and people who 
advise them. Emotional consumers can improve self-control by reminding themselves 
about the consistent rather than the inconsistent benefits associated with making a 
virtuous choice. For example, anxious students would be more likely to study if they 
think about how getting good grades will lead to greater safety and control, whereas 
angry students would be more likely to study if they think about how good grades will 
lead to power and prestige. Similarly, policy makers and businesses in the position of 
giving advice (e.g., gym trainers, or financial advisors) could benefit from customizing 
their encouragement to emphasize benefits consistent with the dominant emotion that 
their customers are experiencing. For instance, bankers trying to encourage consumers 
with low financial literacy to learn more about financial products, such as credit cards, 
should emphasize the security features offered by credit cards to anxious consumers, but 
emphasize the status or prestige associated with high-end credit cards to angry 
consumers. Similarly, policy makers, federal tax agencies, and employers that nudge 
their workers to save money for retirement or commit their tax returns towards savings 
may be more effective if the nudges are aligned with the emotions that the workers are 
experiencing (Kumar and Shah 2011). 
Finally, a goal-based choice model not only helps explain the effect of emotions 
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on choice in self-control dilemmas, the model can also integrate much of past literature 
on the different factors that influence self-control. Specifically, the goal-based choice 
model suggests four factors that influence whether or not a consumer exerts self-control. 
The first is the strength of the consumer’s hedonic need (N1). Because the gratifying 
option in self-control dilemmas better facilitates hedonic needs than the virtuous option 
(GB1 > VB1), increasing the activation of  hedonic needs increases the likelihood of 
selecting the gratifying option, whereas decreasing the activation of hedonic needs 
decreases the likelihood of selecting the gratifying option. Indeed, research shows that 
increasing the desire to feel better tends to impair self-control (Cryder et al. 2008; 
Fishbach and Labroo 2007; Garg et al. 2007; Tice et al. 2001), whereas reducing the 
activation of visceral hedonic cravings, such as hunger and sexual desire, increases self-
control (Loewenstein 1996; Van Boven and Loewenstein 2003; Xu, Schwarz, and Wyer 
2015).  
A second factor that influences self-control is the relative instrumentality of the 
gratifying and virtuous options towards the consumer’s hedonic need. While gratifying 
options, by definition, offer stronger hedonic benefits compared to virtuous ones (i.e., 
GB1 > VB1), the magnitude of the difference in instrumentality may vary. For example, 
individuals may either believe that indulging will offer a small, temporary boost to their 
mood or believe that it will make them exuberant (i.e., GB1 can vary in magnitude). 
Alternatively, individuals may either believe that exerting self control will be a very 
painful sacrifice or believe that it will be a pleasurable act of frugality (i.e., VB1 can vary 
in magnitude). Consistently, the literature demonstrates that decreasing the 
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instrumentality of the gratifying options towards hedonic needs increases self-control. 
For example, mood freeze manipulations (Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini 1984), 
which make consumers believe that gratifying won’t offer hedonic benefits (i.e., 
reducing GB1), increase self-control (Tice et al. 2001). Conversely, increasing the 
virtuous option’s instrumentality towards hedonic needs also increases self-control. For 
instance, consumers are more likely to delay gratification when the anticipation of it is 
pleasurable (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Loewenstein 1987; Nowlis, Mandel, and 
McCabe 2004).  
A third factor that influences self-control is the strength of consumers’ other (i.e., 
non-hedonic) needs. For instance, because the virtuous option is better able to help 
consumers restore control, avoid future regret, and reduce opportunity costs, activating 
the need for control, regret avoidance, or avoidance of high opportunity costs, tends to 
improve self-control (Cutright and Samper 2014; Frederick et al. 2009; Hoch and 
Loewenstein 1991; Patrick, Chun, and Macinnis 2009; Spiller 2011).  
The fourth factor that influences self-control is the relative instrumentality of the 
gratifying (i.e., GB2, GB3, etc.) and virtuous options (i.e., VB2, VB3, etc.) towards these 
other needs (Fishbach and Choi 2012; Zhang, Fishbach, and Kruglanski 2007). Thus, as 
we show in study 2b, increasing the instrumentality of the vituous option (i.e., increasing 
VBn) improves self-control, whereas increasing the instrumentality of the gratifying 
option (i.e., increasing GBn) impairs self-control.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
 
Although we propose a general model of how negative emotions influence 
decisions in self-control dilemmas, we focus on the effects of two specific negative 
emotions, anger and anxiety, and two specific benefits, dominance and security. One 
opportunity for future research will be to investigate the effects of other emotions and 
other benefits. For example, a goal-based model of choice predicts that disgust, which 
activates a need to avoid contaminants (Rozin et al. 2008), should improve self-control 
by decreasing the likelihood that consumers eat unhealthy foods but impair self-control 
by decreasing the likelihood that consumers exercise in a crowded gym. Similarly, a 
goal-based model would also predict that embarrassment, which activates a need to be 
accepted or reintegrated into a group (Keltner and Anderson 2000), should improve self-
control when in-group members typically behave virtuously but decrease self-control 
when in-group members typically gratify.  
Successful regulation of self-control typically requires more than a single 
virtuous decision. It requires making virtuous decisions consistently over a period of 
time (Campbell and Warren 2015; Vosgerau et al. 2016). Thus, another limitation of our 
research is that it examines the effects of emotions on a single decision rather than the 
effects of emotions on a more complex sequence of decisions that ultimately determines 
consumers’ success in regulating their self-control. Because the effects of incidentally 
manipulated emotions tend to be ephemeral, it would be difficult to examine how 
incidental emotions influence a series of self-control choices over time. Nevertheless, 
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there may be an opportunity to test how chronic individual differences in emotions, as 
measured in study 4, influence sequences of decisions.  
Accounting for the interplay between the specific needs activated by an emotion 
and the benefits of options in self-control dilemmas offers a key to understanding the 
complex and seemingly inconsistent effects of emotions on self-control. We encourage 
emotion researchers to continue to think about the needs activated by specific emotions, 
self-control researchers to think about the benefits linked to the specific gratifying and 
virtuous options in a choice set, and consumer researchers to think about how to leverage 
both of these effects to help improve the decisions of marketers, consumers, and policy 
makers. 
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CHAPTER 4  
CONCLUSION 
Most of us have at one time or another bought a product just because it was 
available on a deal. While deal proneness can emerge from the desire to save money 
(Orhun and Palazzolo, 2016), many a times its irrational, and results in excessive or 
unplanned purchases (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton, 1990). However, what 
causes individual to become temporarily more deal prone is still not clear. 
According to past research, the main driver of deal proneness is consumers’ 
desire to acquire more benefits with fewer resources (Fernbach, Kan, and Lynch, 2015; 
Lichtenstein et al., 1990; Thaler, 1985). In other words, when consumers seek efficieny 
with resources, they are more likely to exhibit deal proneness. While prior research has 
shown that this desire to be efficient with resources is influenced by individual 
differences (Lichtenstein et al., 1990), in this research we identify an important 
antecedent that can temporarily enhance it. We find that anxiety that stems from the 
perceived lack of goal progress (Carver and Scheier 1990) activates the desire to seek 
efficiency. Additionally, by activating the desire to seek efficieny, anxiety not only 
increases proneness to deals, but also a host of other financial behaviors. For instance, 
anxiety increases the desire to qualify for free shipping, even if that requires that 
individuals buy unplanned products, so as to cross over the mark at which free shipping 
is available.  It also causes consumers to overconsume goods or services after paying a 
fixed cost for unlimited consumption, such as at an all-you-can-eat-buffet. By causing 
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consumers to thus seek efficiency, anxiety can both help and hurt consumer savings. 
Therefore, while most of past literature suggests that distress causes individuals to pay a 
premium on products or services (Cryder, Lerner, Gross, and Dahl, 2008), we find that 
anxiety’s effect on consumer savings, is more complex. 
In the second essay we further extend this line of enquiry to examine how 
negative emotions impact self-control behavior. Negative emotions have generally been 
shown to harm self-control. For example, distressed consumers eat more junk-food 
(Garg, Wansink, and Inman, 2007), and save less money (Cryder et al., 2008). However, 
even though negative emotions have been shown to cause poor behavior, their main 
function is to help humans cope with problems of survival and reproductive success 
(Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, and Gross, 2005). To cope with problems, 
emotions activate needs (Tooby and Cosmides 1990) that motivate corrective actions. 
For instance, fear, and anxiety activate the need to avoid uncertainty and risk (Lerner 
and Keltner, 2001; Tiedens and Linton, 2001), and make safer choices (Raghunathan, 
Pham, and Corfman, 2006). Thus, if negative emotions are adaptive solutions to 
challenges in the physical and social environment, there should be at-least some contexts 
in which they don't impair self-control. Building on this idea, we provide a method to 
mitigate self-control impairment caused by two widespread negative emotions, namely 
anger, and anxiety. 
We find that anxiety signals a threat in the future, and therefore activates a need 
to seek security (Raghunathan et al., 2006). Thus, anxious consumers are more likely to 
exert self-control when it moves them towards security (e.g., saving for a rainy day). On 
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the other hand, anger is experienced when consumers perceive wrongful interference by 
others. Therefore, anger activates a need to exert dominance. Consequently, angry 
consumers are more likely to exert self-control when it moves them towards a position 
of power (e.g., saving for wealth and influence).  
Across these two essays we examine how negative emotions influence a wide 
range of consumer decisions, from how consumers plan their schedules, and purchase items 
at the supermarket, to how they make choice between vices and virtues. Through this 
research we hope to help consumers understand how experiencing negative emotions can 
alter their consumptions patterns. For instance, by being aware that anxiety enhances deal 
proneness, consumers may be able to cut down on overspending on deals. We also hope to 
inform strategy aimed at marketing to individuals experiencing negative emotions. For 
instance marketing products to angry consumers will be vastly different from marketing 
products to anxious consumers or consumers feeling neutral. Understanding the motivations 
of emotional consumers can greatly improve how firms interact with these consumers 
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APPENDIX A: 
FILTERED PARTICIPANTS IN CHAPTER 2 
 
Study 1  
Two hundred and eighty-two participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small payment. Seven responses 
were dropped because the respondents had already previously taken either the entire study, 
or the emotion manipulation. 
 
Study 2  
Four hundred and seventy four participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small compensation. Twenty 
four participants were excluded because they indicated that they had taken a similar or the 
same study previously. Eighteen other participants were excluded because they took the 
entire study twice.  
 
Study 4  
Two hundred and thirty participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small payment. Twelve participants 
were excluded because they indicated that they had taken a similar or the same study 
previously. Two other participants were excluded because they took the entire study twice.  
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Study 5  
Four hundred and fifty-eight undergraduate students at a Southwestern university 
in the United States participated in the study in return for course credit. Seventy nine 
participants were dropped because they indicated that they had done a previous version of 
the study.   
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APPENDIX B:  
STIMULI USED IN STUDIES IN CHAPTER 2 
 
Emotion Manipulation used in Study 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Participants were randomly distributed to one of three emotion conditions (“Active 
Anxiety”, “Passive Anxiety, “Neutral emotion”). The manipulation consisted of two 
questions. The question asked in the three emotion conditions were as follows: 
 
Active Anxiety Condition 
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Passive Anxiety Condition 
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Neutral Emotion Condition 
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Study 1 DV 
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Task 1 
 
 
Task 2 
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Quiz on Task 1 and Task 2 
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Study 2 DV 
Unlimited Condition 
Pizza 
 
Drinks 
 
 
Pay Per Use Condition 
Pizza 
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Drinks 
 
 
Study 2 Covariates  
 
 
Study 3 DV 
Hypothetical Shopping Task 
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Replicate 1 
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Replicate 2 
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DV: Scheduling Task 
 
 
Replicate 1 
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Replicate 2 
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Study 4 DV 
 
 
Study 5 Stimuli 
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Males were shown the following options Females were shown the following options
Males were shown the following options Females were shown the following options
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Emotion Manipulations used in Study 5 
 
Emotion Condition: Anxiety induced by Scarcity of Resources 
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Emotion Condition: Anxiety Induced by Slow Progress 
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Emotion Condition: Neutral Emotion  
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DV 
Condition: Efficiency Hurts Resource Conservation  
 
 
Condition: Efficiency Helps Resource Conservation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
APPENDIX C:  
MEASURES USED IN CHAPTER 2 
 
Below we report all the items measured in the studies. We did not use items except those 
that were reported in the study descriptions in our analyses. All the items were collected 
after the focal IV and DV had been administered, unless otherwise specified. Items are 
followed by a number or numbers indicating the studies in which they were used.  
 
Construct Measures 
Mturk ID, Lab ID 
(Measured before 
the IV and DV) 
Please enter your Lab ID study 6 
Please enter the last 4 digits of your UIN? study 4,5 
Please enter your Mturk ID. study 1, study 2, study 3 
Study 1 
How well do you know German? Very well/ Moderately/ Not at 
all  
Study 2 
In a typical meal, how many slices of pizza would you usually 
eat (assuming you were having pizza)? 0 slices/Over 16 slices 
 
When at a social gathering, how many drinks (alcoholic and non 
alcoholic) would you typically have (assuming you were 
drinking)? 0 drinks/Over 10 drinks 
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To what extent are you trying to diet or lose weight? I want to 
gain weight. / I don't care about my weight. / I want to keep at 
my current weight. / I am trying to lose few pounds. / I am trying 
to lose around 10 pounds. / I am trying to lose more than 10 
pounds. 
Study 5 
Do you try to Save money? Absolutely Not/ Definitely Yes 
What was the price of the shoes? $59.99/ $74.99/ $42.49/ $100 
What was the price of the sunglasses? $59.99/ $74.99/ $42.49/ 
$100 
To qualify for free shipping, the order had to be more than 
________?  $59.99/ $74.99/ $42.49/ $100 
Household 
Income, study 1, 2, 4 
Indicate total household income. Below $25,000/Over $85,000 
Language, study 1, 2, 4 What is your primary language? English/ Spanish/ Some Other 
Gender, study 1, 2,5  What’s your gender?  
Age, study 2 What’s your age? 
Previous exposure 
to emotion 
manipulation  
Have you don’t the study before? study 1, 2, 4, 5 
Have you written the essay before? study 1 
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APPENDIX D:  
FILTERED PARTICIPANTS IN CHAPTER 3 
 
Study 1  
 
Two hundred and forty-four undergraduate students at a Southwestern university 
in the United States completed the study in return for research credits. Responses by 
seventy two participants were dropped because they indicated that they were not looking 
for a job. An additional sixteen participants were dropped because they had taken a 
previous version of the study before, while twenty two participants were dropped 
because they indicated that they had already taken the emotion manipulation task in a 
previous study. 
 
Study 2a  
 
Two hundred and sixty two undergraduate students at a Southwestern university 
in the United States completed the study in return for research credits. Responses by 
forty-two participants were removed from the dataset. Eleven responses were removed 
because they had no correct responses for either all of security sentences or all of 
dominance sentences. The remaining thirty-one participants were removed because they 
indicated that they had not understood the instructions for responding to the lexical 
decision task, after completing the study.  
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 Study 2b 
 
Two hundred and three undergraduate students at a Southwestern university in 
the United States participated in the study in return for credits. Twenty four participants 
were dropped. Of those, twenty three participants were dropped because they had done a 
previous version of the study. The remaining one participant was dropped because he 
indicated that he had already read one of the articles in the self-control task, and 
therefore had to forcibly choose the other one in the open ended feedback section after 
debriefing.   
 
Study 3 
 
Three hundred and eighty four participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (M-Turk) completed an online survey in return for a small payment. Twenty-one 
participants were dropped because they indicated that they had already seen the video 
shown in the emotion manipulation task. Additionally, twenty nine participants who has 
already taken a previous version of the study, and twenty participants who retook this 
study a second time were also dropped.  
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Study 4 
 
Nine hundred and one participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
completed an online survey in return for a small payment. Thirty seven participants were 
dropped because they had already done the study.  
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APPENDIX E:  
RESULTS WITHOUT COVARIATES AND RELATED EXCLUSIONS FOR 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Study 1 
 
To test the effects of emotions on self-control, we conducted a 3 (Emotion: 
anger, anxiety, and neutral) × 2 (Benefits: security, dominance) between-subjects logistic 
regression. Unlike the main analysis, we did not filter out participants’ who not were 
looking for a job. In line with our predictions, the effect of the emotion manipulation on 
self-control depended on whether jobs were associated with dominance or security (two-
way interaction: Wald χ²(2) = 6.00; p = .0497). Specifically, emotions increased self-
control when jobs were associated with a consistent benefit rather than an inconsistent 
benefit. Angry participants were more likely to choose the job-interview article over the 
entertaining article when jobs were described as a path to greater influence (69.44%) 
rather than security (44.00%, Wald χ²(1) = 3.85; p = .0499). Conversely, anxious 
participants were directionally more likely to choose the job interview article over the 
entertaining article when jobs were described as a path to security (53.84%) rather than 
influence (46.67%, Wald χ²(1) =.349; p = .554). Participants in the neutral condition, 
were also directionally more likely to read the job interview article when jobs were 
described as a means to more security (63.64%) rather than influence (46.67%, Wald 
χ²(1) = 1.814; p = .1781).  
 151 
 
Study 4 
 
To assess whether the instrumentality of saving money towards the need 
activated by anger and anxiety depends on whether the decision takes place immediately 
or in the distant future, we regressed the amount of the tax refund participants indicated 
they would save on the manipulated factors, the trait emotion measures, and their 
interactions. Specifically, we regressed the savings measure on two dummy-coded 
variables representing the benefit manipulation, one dummy-coded variable representing 
the temporal distance manipulation, the benefit-by-distance interaction, the mean-
centered score on the trait anger scale, the mean-centered score on the trait anxiety scale, 
and the two and three-way interactions between each trait emotion measure and the 
variables representing the benefit and distance manipulations. Unlike the main analysis, 
we did not control for measure order, and the extent to which the participant was trying 
to save money outside of the study. 
The two focal three-way interactions did not reach significance, but the results 
were in the same direction. Temporal distance directionally moderated the interaction 
between both the trait anger measure and the benefit manipulation (F(2, 846) = 1.93, p = 
.146) and the trait anxiety measure and the benefit manipulation (F(2, 846) = 1.99, p = 
.137). When participants choose how much money to save now, a match between benefit 
instrumentality and the need activated by an emotion directionally increased savings. As 
in prior studies, dominance and security benefits directionally moderated the effect of 
anger (F(1,846) = 2.37, p = .124) and significantly moderated the effect of anxiety 
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(F(1,846) = 10.63, p = .001) on savings in the present condition. We used spotlight 
analysis technique to examine the relationship between the trait emotion measures and 
savings in each of the conditions. When participants were deciding how much money to 
save right now, the results were consistent with the predictions. Participants who scored 
more than one standard deviation above average on the anger scale saved more when 
savings benefited dominance (M = $595) rather than security (M = $487; F(1,846) = 
3.70, p = .058). Conversely, participants who scored less than one standard deviation 
below average on the anger scale saved equally when savings benefited dominance (M = 
$ 552) or security (M = $581; F(1,846) =.23, NS). On the other hand, participants who 
scored more than one standard deviation above average on the anxiety scale saved more 
when savings benefited security (M = $586) rather than dominance (M = $487; F(1,846) 
= 3.15, p = .076), whereas participants who scored less than one standard deviations 
below average saved less when savings benefited security (M = $483) rather than 
dominance (M = $661; F(1,846) = 9.60, p = .002). 
Consistent with H3, when participants choose how much money to save in the 
future, a match between benefit instrumentality and the need activated by an emotion did 
not increase savings. Neither the interaction between security and dominance benefits 
and anger (F(1,846) = 1.52, NS), nor the interaction between security and dominance 
benefits and anxiety (F(1,846) = 0.70, NS) was significant.  
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APPENDIX F:  
STIMULI USED IN STUDIES IN CHAPTER 3 
 
Study 1 
 
Participants were randomly distributed of one of three emotion conditions 
(“Anger”, “Anxiety, “Neutral emotion”). The manipulation consisted of two questions. 
The question asked in the three emotion conditions were as follows: 
 
Anger Condition 
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Anxiety Condition 
 
 
Neutral-Emotion Condition 
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Stimuli used to manipulate Perceived Benefits: 
Dominance condition 
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Security Condition 
 
 
Neutral-Benefit Condition 
 
 
 157 
 
Measure used to examine whether the participants were looking for a job or not. Options 
in the rectangle indicated that the participant was not looking for a job. 
 
 
 
Study 2a 
 
Participants were randomly distributed of one of three emotion conditions 
(“Anger”, “Anxiety, “Neutral emotion”). The manipulation used was same as in Study 1. 
Next they were asked to respond to a Lexical Decision Task. In the Lexical Decision 
Task, they were asked to identify whether or not the sentence they saw on the screen was 
grammatically correct or not. They were shown the following sentences, on which their 
response times were recorded. 
 
Sentences related to Security 
1. Try to comfort her. 
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2. Seek shelter during tornadoes. 
 
Sentences related to Dominance 
1. She dominates the tournament. 
2. The captain gave orders. 
 
Neutral Sentences 
1. They organized the event. 
2. The seats are uncomfortable. 
3. It's an important concept. 
4. They had to comment. 
5. Actors performed on stage. 
 
Grammatically wrong (non) sentences  
1. Not machine working is. 
2. Crossword the finished puzzle. 
3. They periodically trend do. 
4. A parallel it's arguement. 
5. With stick usually basics. 
6. Morning it yesterday started. 
7. There alignment between no. 
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8. Apart subject keep object. 
9. Structure has and forum. 
 
Study 2b 
 
Sentence Scrambling Task 
Sentences used to manipulate Security Need (unscrambled) 
1) Try to comfort her 
2) He felt very vulnerable. 
3) Parents protect their children. 
4) Get an affordable insurance. 
5) Care for the elderly. 
6) Seek shelter during tornado. 
7) Doctors relieved his pain. 
8) Prevent him from drowning. 
Sentences used to manipulate Dominance Need (unscrambled) 
1) He had the authority. 
2) Captain gave the orders. 
3) They had full command. 
4) US controls world economy. 
5) She dominates the tournament. 
6) I feel very competitive. 
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7) We’re a strong team. 
8) It’s been a privilege. 
Filler sentences common in both the need conditions (unscrambled) 
1) What did they buy? 
2) Walking in the park. 
3) The paint is peeling. 
4) They arrived very late. 
5) I got up early. 
6) She can see you. 
7) He drew a picture. 
8) It rained this morning. 
9) Please pass the salt. 
10) I unlocked the door. 
11) The ball is red. 
12) The birds flew south. 
Participants next made the choice between a job-interview article, and an 
entertaining article. The stimuli use to manipulate perceived benefits of the job-interview 
article was the same as study 1.  
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Study 3 
 
Emotion in this study were manipulated using videos. 
 
 
The benefits in the choice task were either associated with the virtuous option (saving 
money by choosing the gift card to the super-market) or the gratifying option (buying an 
additional pair of sunglasses).  
 
Security benefit associated with saving (virtuous option) 
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Dominance benefit associated with saving (virtuous option) 
 
 
 
Dominance benefit associated with sunglasses (gratifying option) 
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Security benefit associated with sunglasses (gratifying option) 
 
 
 
The choice measure was as follows: 
 
 
Study 4 
 
In study 4, participants’ intention to commit a certain amount of their tax refund 
towards savings was used as a measure of self-control. To set up the scenario 
participants were told the following: 
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Benefit associated with the virtuous option (savings) was manipulated as follows: 
Security condition: 
 
Dominance Condition: 
 
Neutral-Benefit Condition: 
 
 
Next, temporal distance to self-control behavior was manipulated as follows: 
 
Present Condition  
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Future Condition 
 
 
Saving intentions were measured on a scale of $0 - $1000, in increments of $20. 
Trait Anger, and Trait Anxiety were measured using the State-Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger and Reheiser 2009). 
 
Scores on participants’ baseline propensity to save was measured using the following 
single item. 
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APPENDIX G:  
MEASURES USED IN CHAPTER 3 
 
Below we report all the items measured in the studies. However, barring the 
items mentioned in the study descriptions, the remaining items were not used in the 
analyses. We report them for completeness of the study descriptions. All the items listed 
below were collected after the focal IV and DV had been administered, unless otherwise 
specified. Items are followed by a number or numbers indicating the studies in which 
they were used.  
 
 
Construct Measures 
Relevance of 
benefits study 2b 
To what extend was the statement about jobs relevant to you? 1 
= Absolutely not relevant / 7 = Absolutely relevant.  
What is your 
overall opinion of 
article? study 2b 
Bad / Good 
Easy / Difficult 
Boring / Interesting 
Job Search study 1 
 
 
How knowledgeable were you about questions typically asked in 
job interviews, before coming to lab today? Not at all 
Knowledgeable/ Very knowledgeable  
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When do you plan to start looking for a job or an internship? I 
do not plan to look for a job/internship / I am looking for a 
job/internship now 
Job Search study 2b 
To what extent do you agree with the following? Absolutely Not/ 
Absolutely Yes 
I am looking for a job now. 
Finding a job is top priority for me. 
Mturk ID, Lab ID 
(Measured before 
the IV and DV) 
Please enter your UIN. study 2a, 2b 
Please enter your Mturk ID. study 1, study 3, study 4 
Measure of 
Emotions 
 
 
How are you feeling right now? Very Little/ Very Much 
Engaged, study 3 
Anxious, study 3, Study 4 
Positive, study 3, Study 4 
Sad, study 3, Study 4 
Hostile, study 3 
Worried, study 3 
Angry, study 3, Study 4 
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Negative, study 3, Study 4 
Attentive, study 3 
Nervous, study 3 
Happy, study 4 
Decoy to minimize 
suspicion about 
emotion 
manipulation, study 3 
Video Feedback Task: How engaging was the video in study 1? 
Not at all / Very Much 
Engaging  
Interesting 
Consumer 
Spending Self 
Control Scale 
(Haws, Bearden, 
and Nenkov 2011), 
study 3 
Please indicate the level of agreement towards the following 
statements. Strongly Disagree/ Strongly Agree 
I strongly monitor my spending behavior. 
I am able to work effectively toward long term financial goals. 
I consider my needs before making purchases. 
I often delay taking actions until I have carefully considered the 
consequences of purchase decisions. 
When I go out with friends, I keep track of what I am spending. 
I am able to resist temptation in order to achieve my budget 
goals. 
I know when to say when regarding how much I spend.  
In social situations, I am generally aware of what I am spending. 
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Having objectives related to spending is important to me. 
I am responsible when it comes to how much I spend. 
Attitude towards 
Sunglasses, study 3 
Dislike/ Like 
Bad/ Good 
Unfavorable/ Favorable 
Saving Money, 
study 4 
How important is saving money to you? Absolutely Not/ 
Definitely Yes 
Do you try to save money? Absolutely Not/ Definitely Yes 
Assets, study 4 
How much assets do you have saved, including money in 
savings account, and investment in stocks and bonds? $0/Above 
$100,000 
Debt, study 4 
How much do you currently have in debt (credit card loans, 
loans towards car, home, education, etc.)? $0/Above $100,000 
Household 
Income, study 4 
Indicate total household income. Below $25,000/Over $85,000 
Language, study 4 What is your primary language? English/ Spanish/ Some Other 
Gender study 1, 2a, 2b, 
3, 4 
 What’s your gender?  
Previous exposure Have you don’t the study before? study 1, study 2b, study 4 
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to stimuli  Have you read the job interview article before? study 2b 
Have you read the entertainment article before? study 2b 
Have you done the unscramble word-task before? study 2b 
Have you seen the video you watched in study 1before? study 3 
LDT Instruction 
Clarity, study 2a 
Did you understand the instructions in the sentence recognition 
task?  
I understood the instructions/ I had trouble in clearly seeing the 
visual stimuli /I was confused at first, but then understood the 
instruction after the task started /I didn’t understand the 
instructions.  
 
 
Attention Filters 
Study 3 and 4 (Measured before the IV and DV) 
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Study 4 (Measured after the IV and DV) 
 
 
Sound Check Question  
Study 3 (Measured before the IV and DV) 
What sound do you here in the following video?  
They were then instructed to here an audio stimuli. They were given the following 
options: 
 Dog 
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 Cow 
 Rain 
 Cat 
 Lion’s Roar 
 Frog 
 A Baby crying 
The right answer was Cat. 
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